Tag: divorce international

International Child Custody and Hague Convention

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

A frequent international child custody issue involves the Hague Child Abduction Convention. Return of abducted children to their habitual residence is required unless defenses are established, in which case ameliorative measures can be considered. Is that also true in a war zone? A court in Montana just decided that question.

Hague Convention2

Home on the Range?

The parents are Ukrainians. They married in the Ukraine and lived in the city of Odessa, Ukraine in an apartment. In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. The parties began to hear explosions and air raid sirens in Odessa based on Russian aerial attacks, and they were forced to sleep in their basement at times.

In August 2023, the father arranged for the mother and their child to stay with family friends in Moldova due to the increased bombing of Odessa. On August 26, 2023, the mother informed the father that she was intending to fly to Montana with the child to be with her mother and sister.

The father began to take steps to secure the return of the child to the Ukraine by filing a Hague application and filing a return petition in Montana.

Florida Hague Convention

I will be speaking about the Hague Convention and international child custody issues at the prestigious Marital & Family Law Review Course in Orlando later this month. The event is co-sponsored by the Florida Bar Family Law Section and the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.

What happens if your children are wrongfully abducted or retained overseas? If that happens, you must become familiar with the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, also known as The Hague Convention. This international treaty exists to protect children from international abductions by requiring the prompt return to their habitual residence.

The Hague Convention applies only in jurisdictions that have signed the convention, and its reach is limited to children ages 16 and under. Essentially, The Hague Convention helps families more quickly revert back to the “status quo” child custody arrangement before an unlawful child abduction.

If your children are wrongfully taken out of the country or wrongfully retained after the time for returning them passed, the Hague Convention can help you get them back.

A Mess in Odessa

At the trial in Montana, it was not disputed that the father established a prima facie case under the Convention. However, the mother argued return to Ukraine would expose the child to a “grave risk” of physical or psychological harm.

The district judge noted that the conflict in Ukraine did not, by itself, trigger the grave risk exception because it’s not sufficient to simply find that because the country is at war, children cannot be returned․

Instead, the focus should be on the risk a child would face in the part of the county she will return to and whether that will imperil her unacceptably. For example, some courts have found that return to certain cities or eastern Ukraine poses a grave risk.

Additionally, the fact that a child has grown accustomed to life in the U.S. was not a valid concern under the grave risk exception, as it is the abduction that causes the pangs of subsequent return. Also, the exception does not provide a license for a court in the abducted-to country to speculate on where the child would be happiest or who would be the better parent. And grave risk does not encompass a home where money is in short supply, or where educational or other opportunities are more limited. Even if a “grave risk” is shown, a court has “the discretion to consider ameliorative measures that could ensure the child’s safe return.

Here, the court found that return to a different city in the Ukraine, Chernivtsi, a city and oblast in southwestern Ukraine was at less risk than the eastern portion of the country such as Odessa. It was also noted that many Ukrainians had relocated to the western part of the country since the invasion.

The Mother’s argument that her voluntary parole status in the United States should be considered. However, to the extent the mother faced a Hobson’s choice, it is a dilemma of her own making. The record showed that the father was willing to allow her and the child to reside outside of Ukraine, but close enough for contact, while custody was determined.

Instead the Mother chose to come to the United States, as opposed to Moldova or another neighboring country, for the undisputed reason that her family was here. Neither the Convention nor this Court’s decision are constrained by that choice.

Based on those facts the court ordered the return of the Child to Chernivtsi, Ukraine and awarded fees and costs.

The order is here.

Registration for the certification review course is here (if available)

Speaking on the Hague Convention and Interstate Custody

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

Honored to be invited to speak on interstate custody and the Hague Convention at the prestigious Marital & Family Law Review Course in Orlando from January 24th to January 25th. The seminar is co-sponsored by the Florida Bar Family Law Section and the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.

Divorce Religion

Raising Arizona

A recent state court case in Arizona applied both the Hague Convention and state law to order law enforcement to immediately pick up a child allegedly being retained in Arizona by the child’s Father. The Father argued that his due process was violated by not providing an opportunity to be heard.

A child was subject to a parenting time order in Mexico. The child otherwise resided with the Mother, Cohen, in Mexico, and the Father, Gbele, to timeshare in the United States.

On December 20, 2023, the Mother filed a petition under the Hague Convention in Arizona state court alleging the Father refused to return the child to Mexico under their Mexican order, and seeking an order for the child’s removal to Mexico.

The trial court found that the Father had not been served, authorized service by alternative means, and temporarily restrained the Father from removing the child from Arizona. After the Mother filed a notice that the Father was served with process, the trial court entered a “pick-up order” to transfer custody to the Mother in Mexico based on testimony at an earlier hearing that the child is imminently likely to suffer serious physical harm or be removed from this state without the issuance” of the order.

The Father asked to vacate the pick-up order for lack of jurisdiction and due process. On the final hearing day, the court neither took evidence nor decided the merits of the petition. Instead, it determined the Father could not challenge the pick-up order because that order did not resolve any of the Mother’s claims from the petition, and therefore was not a final judgment.

The trial court also refused to vacate the pick-up order as moot because the relief of return was effectuated and awarded the Mother travel expenses. The Father appealed.

Florida UCCJEA and Hague Convention

Parents move from state to state for various reasons. It is a subject matter I have written and spoken about many times. Whether children are moved by parents wrongfully or not, moving your children creates interstate custody and support and problems.

What happens if your children are wrongfully abducted or retained overseas? If that happens, you must become familiar with the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, also known as The Hague Convention. This international treaty exists to protect children from international abductions by requiring the prompt return to their habitual residence.

The Hague Convention applies only in jurisdictions that have signed the convention, and its reach is limited to children ages 16 and under. Essentially, The Hague Convention helps families more quickly revert back to the “status quo” child custody arrangement before an unlawful child abduction.

The UCCJEA is a uniform act which promotes cooperation with other courts and ensures that a custody decree is rendered in the state which is in a superior position to decide the best interest of the child.

The UCCJEA helps to facilitate enforcement of custody decrees – even when the custody decrees come from a foreign country – and has the aspirational goal of promoting uniformity of the laws governing custody issues. Under the UCCJEA, a foreign country should be treated as a US state for the purposes of applying the UCCJEA.

Arizona Appeal

On appeal, the Mother argued the appeal was moot because the child was returned to Mexico, where it is undisputed the child is subject to a custody proceeding. The appellate court held that mootness is a discretionary doctrine, and in addition to the pick-up order, the Father also challenged the award of transportation costs, which was sufficient to prevent the appeal from being moot.

The Mother also argued that the trial court had discretion to order the child’s immediate removal under ICARA, which implements the Hague Convention in the United States. ICARA enacted provisional measures “to protect the well-being of the child involved or to prevent the child’s further removal or concealment before the final disposition of the petition.”

In rejecting the provisional measures, the court found there was neither allegation nor evidence concerning the child’s well being or any risk of further removal by the Father and the court’s order was not a final disposition of the petition.

Even if ICARA’s provisional remedies allowed the trial court discretion to enforce a provisional remedy, ICARA also provides that no court may order a child removed from a person having physical control of the child unless the applicable requirements of State law are satisfied.

Under Arizona and federal constitutions you are guaranteed due process. Additionally, under Arizona law, a petition to  enforce a foreign child custody order generally requires notice and a hearing before the trial court may order that the petitioner take immediate custody of a child. On remand, the appellate court direct the trial judge to determine whether to dismiss the petition in light of the child’s removal.

The opinion is available here.

North Korea Divorce Requirements

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

North Korea, similar to many countries, has requirements to initiate a divorce proceeding. Just as many U.S. states have requirements before filing for divorce, North Korea has its requirements too. Frustrated by the number of divorces, the Supreme Leader of North Korea has just added a new requirement: any couple that divorces will now be sent to labor camps.

North Korea Divorce

Your North Korean Divorce

Kim Jong Un, at 42 years of age, is North Korea’s “Supreme Leader”. He is also the “general secretary of the Worker’s Party”, and the “marshal of the Korean People’s Army”. Kim Jong Un follows in his father’s and grandfather’s footsteps and rules the socialist paradise of North Korea.

As “Comrade General Secretary”, Kim Jong Un recently declared that dissolving your marriage demonstrates anti-socialist sympathies, which therefore warrants punishment. This declaration from the “Marshal of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” represents a toughening of existing divorce laws, which previously only punished the party seeking the divorce — even in cases of physical abuse.

The “Sun of Juche’s” new divorce law, in an effort to protect the family structure, requires that spouses be imprisoned once the divorce is finalized. As one resident of the northern Ryanggang province reportedly said:

“I went to the Kimjongsuk County People’s Court … where 12 people received divorce decrees. Immediately after the verdict, they were transferred to the county labor training camp. Until last year, when a couple divorced, only the person who first filed for divorce was sent to a labor training camp. Starting this month, all divorced couples will be sent to labor training camps.”

According to Kim Jon Un, who is sometimes known as the “Only and Unique Successor and Leader of the Juche Revolution”, the act of divorce is not only considered an affront to socialism, but also to the Confucian values that tie into the thinking of those in the north and south.

Florida Divorce Requirements

I have written on divorce jurisdiction issues, such as residency and other requirements to obtain a divorce, many times before. Similar to North Korea, Florida has its own requirements to obtain a divorce. For example, Florida has a six-month residency requirement before filing for divorce.

Durational residency – as a pre-condition to divorce – has been considered by many courts and upheld as a valid requirement. The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently recognized the unique status of marriage and has left the entire field of marriage and divorce laws to the individual states.

Florida has a compelling state interest in requiring a durational residency so that Florida avoids intruding on the rights and interests of other states that might otherwise be paramount. There is another important reason.

Domicile of a divorcing party is essential, not merely because of technical jurisdictional rules, but because a divorce can be obtained ex parte, by constructive service of process which can have permanent future effect on the lives and property of third persons as well as the rights of sister states.

Accordingly, U.S. states must go slow, must be careful, and owe a duty to other states and other affected parties to make a record in support of a divorce final judgment that can withstand collateral attack and which will merit full faith and credit by other states.

Stigmatizing Divorce

The foundation of North Korean-style socialism, with its emphasis on the people and the masses, depends on whether family cells are managed effectively. That’s why – to North Korea’s “Brilliant Comrade” – divorce is considered an abnormal event and the breakup of the family.

Broken families are classified as social problems, and the children of these families often do not get along with other children and suffer various forms of discrimination, such as not being called on in school.

The socialist party’s firmly held position is that revolutionizing the family is equivalent to revolutionizing society and that improving the members of the family is equivalent to improving members of society. As a result, government officials who are divorced are considered to have failed to revolutionize their family, and are often unable to rise in rank or hold important positions.

Notwithstanding the “Beloved Father’s” efforts, reports from North Korea show divorce rates increased on the back of the Covid-19 lockdown. Initially, the “Father Marshal” started an education campaign to prevent, specifically women, from getting divorces.

To prevent divorces, lectures were given to members of the Socialist Women’s Union, the largest women’s organization in the country, under the theme:

“Let’s thoroughly eliminate the phenomenon of divorce and build a harmonious family, the cell of society.”

When that didn’t work, the “Supreme Leader of our Party, State and Armed Forces” tried other deterrents. The most obvious deterrents, publicly shaming the parents of divorcees, and publicly shaming the officials of  state owned companies responsible for high divorce rates among the workforce, were applied.

Surprisingly, given the socialist party’s campaign and other deterrents, divorces did not significantly decrease. So, the “Respected Comrade Supreme Leader” had no real choice but to act even more punitively by sending divorcing couples to forced labor camps. As one resident is reported to have said:

My brother divorced after three years of marriage. His wife first submitted a divorce application to the court and received a divorce ruling. She was sent to a labor camp for six months, while he has to do one month.

The London Evening Standard article is here.

Hague Convention and the Mature Child Exception

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

A  common international custody issue under the Hague Convention involves a wrongfully removed child when there is an exception to being returned home. One such exception is the mature child exception. How mature does a child have to be in order to avoid being returned to the child’s habitual residence? A recent Florida case analyzes that question.

Hague Mature Child 2

Oh Mexico

The Father and Mother are the parents of a child born in Mexico in 2013. They lived together in Mexico until approximately one year after the child was born. After their separation, a Mexican court granted custodial rights and child support obligations. The custody order also contained a clause which prohibited Mother from removing minor child from Mexico without Father’s consent.

Then in December 2022, the Mother abducted the child to the United States. After learning his child was abducted, the Father filed a return petition under the Hague Convention in Florida.

The Mother opposed returning the child by arguing that the child was “sufficiently mature and intelligent to object to being repatriated to Mexico.” The trial court conducted an in-camera interview with the child who was then ten years old and had been exclusively with Mother in Florida for over a year. The child testified she lived in an apartment with Mother and her little brother and was attending school and taking English classes. She enjoyed playing at parks and wanted to join a football team.

She also admitted seeing Mother crying and being told by Mother that Father wanted minor child to go back to Mexico and that “I’m afraid that you might be sending me back to Mexico and that I won’t be able to see my mom.” The Mother testified she not only told minor child about the proceedings, but also told her she feared minor child “would be taken back to Mexico and no longer be with me.”

The trial judge denied the Hague return petition after applying the mature child exception. The father appealed.

Hague Convention

I have written and spoken on international custody and child abduction cases under the Hague Convention. The Convention’s mission is basic: to return children to their country of habitual residence.

In the recent Mexican case, the father had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child was a habitual resident of Mexico immediately before her abduction, the removal was in breach of his custody rights under Mexican law, and he was actually exercising rights of custody, or would have been so exercised but for the removal. If so, the child must be promptly returned to Mexico unless there is an exception to return.

The key inquiry in this recent case was the mature child exception. A court may refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is ap­propriate to take account of its views. A court may find that the child’s objection in and of itself is conclusive—it does not have to be coupled with another defense to be sustained.

Talking ’bout Mexico

On appeal, the district court noted that the child was exceptionally bright and articulate, she calmly and clearly conveyed her reluctance to return to Mexico, and conveyed significant family ties, teachers, and friends in Florida.

But in determining whether the mature child exception applies, courts primarily consider whether the child is sufficiently mature, has a particularized objection to being returned and whether the objection is the product of undue influence.

Here, the ten-year-old child’s preference to remain with Mother in Florida was based primarily on: friends, a desire to attend high school, and an upcoming school trip to Orlando. The appellate court found these to be generic and near-sighted responses and demonstrated the child’s inability to maturely comprehend or appreciate the long-term impact of her decisions.

This was especially true considering the child provided no significant testimony as to her life in Mexico or how life in Mexico differed from life in the United States. Also, her fear of return was based solely on not wanting to be separated from her Mother and return to Mexico does not necessarily mean she will be separated from Mother as Mother is free to return with her to Mexico.

Importantly, only a child’s objection is sufficient to trump the Convention’s strong presumption in favor of return, not the child’s mere preference. Here, the child just didn’t want to be separated from her mom. The only fear of returning to Mexico was being separated from Mother and not an unwillingness to live in Mexico.

Finally, the child’s objection was clearly the product of Mother’s undue influence. For example the Mother admitted she told minor child about the legal proceedings and about her fears of minor child being returned to Mexico.

The court reversed and remanded for the trial court to grant return to Mexico.

The opinion is here.

Hague Convention Now Settled Defense

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

An increasingly litigated area of international child custody involves returning a child to their habitual residence under the Hague Convention. However, there are also defenses to a return under the Convention. Recently, a Florida court answered the question whether a wrongfully retained child in Florida was now settled here and need not be returned.

Hague Convention

Return to Machu Picchu?

In the Florida case, a Father and Mother married in Peru in 2012. One child was born during the marriage, and all three are Peruvian citizens. They divorced in 2015, had joint custody, but the child lived primarily with Mother.

In 2021, Mother wanted to visit Florida. The parents signed a travel authorization for the trip from September 2021, through October 2021. However, the Mother and Child never returned. More than a year later, Father filed a state court petition for return of the child to Peru.

The trial court found that Father had rights of custody, had been exercising his rights at the time of the wrongful retention and Peru was the child’s habitual residence.

However, the trial court found that the Father was aware that the Mother was not returning to Peru with the Child before the October return date and that the Mother established, by a preponderance of the evidence, the “well settled” or “now settled” recognized exception under the Hague Convention. The Father appealed.

Florida and the Hague Convention

I have written and spoken on international custody and child abduction under the Hague Convention. The Convention’s mission is basic: to return children to the State of their habitual residence to require any custody disputes to be resolved in that country, and to discourage parents from taking matters into their own hands by abducting or retaining a child.

The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered wrongful where it is in breach of rights of custody under the law of the State in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention; and at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have been so exercised but for the removal or retention.

However, a child need not be returned if it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in the new environment. The U.S. State Department’s interpretation of what “settled” means includes factors such as the child’s age; the stability and duration of the child’s residence in the new environment; whether the child attends school or day care consistently or inconsistently; friends and relatives and participation in school activities, such as team sports, youth groups, or school clubs for example.

Unsettling

The appellate court found that the “well settled in her new environment” exception to the Hague Convention, is not specifically defined in either the Convention itself or in the federal implementing statute ICARA.

But, a child has been considered to be “settled ‘within the meaning of the Convention when a child has significant connections to their new home that indicate that the child has developed a stable, permanent, and non-transitory life in their new country to such a degree that return would be to child’s detriment.

The appellate court reviewed the extensive testimony and the record which adequately shows that the trial court received competent substantial evidence. Accordingly, the appellate court held that Father failed to establish that clear error was committed by the trial court in finding that Mother met her burden of proof on this exception and in thereafter exercising its discretion to not return Child to Peru. Accordingly, the final order denying Father’s petition for return of Child to Peru is affirmed.

The opinion is here.

Exclusivity and International Child Support Orders

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

In the Unites States, once a court of a state has entered a child custody or child support order, the state keeps control of the custody and child support matter unless specific things happen. This exclusivity is true in international child support orders and recently came into play in a case starting in Australia.

Foreign Child Support

A Blunder Down Under?

In 2010, an Australian court awarded two parents equal timesharing of their daughter and incorporated their binding child support agreement. But then in 2018, the Australian court entered another consent order. The parents agreed that the Mother and their daughter could relocate permanently to the United States.

As part of their agreement, the court ordered a long-distance timesharing schedule and added their previous 2018 Child Support Order which provided:

The parents agree to terminate their child support agreement requiring the Father to pay support while the daughter remained in the U.S.

The Father stayed in Australia and the Mother and daughter moved to North Carolina. Soon after, Mother and daughter moved to Florida. This time, they relocated without providing Father with their new address, preventing him from exercising his timesharing rights and contact with their daughter. The Father filed an action in Florida seeking to register and enforce their Australian timesharing order under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.

The Mother filed her own petition asking the Florida court to modify timesharing and child support because the Father had not exercised his timesharing rights, resulting in increased timesharing on her part. The Father moved to dismiss her modification petition, arguing that the Australian court had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. The trial court allowed Mother to file an amended petition and denied Father’s motion to dismiss. The Father then petitioned for a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over Mother’s petition to modify the Australian support order.

Florida and Exclusive Jurisdiction

I have written on international custody and support issues before. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act is one of the uniform acts drafted by the Uniform Law Commission. First developed in 1992, UIFSA resolves interstate jurisdictional disputes about which states can properly establish and modify child support and spousal support orders.

The UIFSA also controls the issue of enforcement of family support obligations within the United States. In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, which required all U.S. states adopt UIFSA, or face loss of federal funding for child support enforcement. Every U.S. state has adopted some version of UIFSA to resolve interstate disputes about support.

One of the more important purposes of UIFSA is to determine the “controlling” order in the event of multiple orders being entered in multiple states and countries. What distinguishes UIFSA is that all states will be enforcing the same amount because there is only one controlling order. Another important feature is that UIFSA adopted a concept that there should be only one court with the exclusive jurisdiction to modify a current support order. The UIFSA uses the term continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.

Back to the Billabong

On appeal, the district court ruled that under UIFSA, Florida courts may modify foreign orders only when a foreign country lacks or refuses jurisdiction to modify its child support order pursuant to its laws or lacked or refused jurisdiction.

In this case, the Mother never alleged that Australia lacked jurisdiction or refused to modify nor did she seek modification in Australia. Because Australia did not lack jurisdiction or refuse to exercise jurisdiction to modify support, the Florida court could not exercise jurisdiction under UIFSA to modify the Australian child support order.

Additionally, the court noted that the Father never waived his objection to the Florida court’s jurisdiction to modify the Australian child support order. Because the Australian court has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its support order, the Florida court lacked jurisdiction over Mother’s petition to modify child support. The appellate court granted prohibition, and the case was remanded with directions to grant Father’s motion to dismiss Mother’s petition to modify the foreign child support order.

The decision is available here.

Islamic Triple Talaq Divorce and the UCCJEA

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

Under Islamic law a husband can get a divorce pretty easily. It’s called the “triple talaq” and involves merely saying the word “talaq” three times. Will enforcement of the triple talaq in the U.S. under the UCCJEA be enforced? A married couple from India is battling the triple talaq divorce in Louisiana.

Triple Talaq UCCJEA

No Place Like Home

Khan and Azeez are citizens of, and were married in, India. However, they moved and have been residing in the United States since 2007.  They have two children. When they traveled to India in 2018, Khan deserted his wife and took her passport. He was granted a divorce under Islamic law by saying the word “talaq” (divorce) three times. However, triple talaq divorces were declared illegal and unconstitutional in India in 2019. This was made retroactive to 2018 under the Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Marriage Act.

When Azeez eventually got a new passport and was able to return to the United States in 2019, she immediately filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Illinois. In his answer, Khan objected to the Illinois family court taking jurisdiction over his case because he was already divorced in India by saying “talaq” three times.

The Illinois trial court denied Khan’s exception under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, and basic principles of human rights. The trial court held that the divorce by talaq and any subsequent child custody determinations were invalid.

In 2019, the Illinois court rendered a judgment finding the India divorce judgment based on triple talaq was invalid. The Illinois court dissolved the marriage, set child custody, and awarded spousal and child support under Illinois law.

Then in 2023, Khan filed a petition in Louisiana seeking to have his Indian divorce judgment recognized under Louisiana law. Azeez filed an exception of res judicata. The Louisiana trial court granted Azeez’s exception and dismissed Khan’s claims and Khan appealed.

Florida and the UCCJEA

I have written about the UCCJEA and the issues of religion and divorce before. The UCCJEA is a uniform act created to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with other courts in child custody matters.

The UCCJEA also promotes cooperation with other courts and ensures that a custody decree is rendered in the state which is in a superior position to decide the best interest of the child.

The UCCJEA helps to facilitate enforcement of custody decrees – even when the custody decrees come from a foreign country – and has the aspirational goal of promoting uniformity of the laws governing custody issues. Under the UCCJEA, a foreign country should be treated as a US state for the purposes of applying the UCCJEA.

However, a U.S. court does need not always recognize a foreign country’s order under the UCCJEA. For example, if the child custody law of a foreign country violates fundamental principles of human rights, the foreign final judgment may not be recognized here.

Triple Talaq Trouble

Khan argued on appeal that the Illinois proceeding was never made executory, and the divorce decree admitted into evidence by the Louisiana court was incompetent and inadmissible evidence because it was not admitted via an ordinary proceeding which would allow Khan to present evidence.

Generally, foreign judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in Louisiana. In fact, courts in the U.S. are required to give full faith and credit to judgments of courts of other states under the U.S. Constitution. The UCCJEA is applicable to foreign judgments, and sets forth specific rules regarding the recognition, modification, and enforcement of child custody determinations. The statute applies to international cases as well as domestic cases.

The purpose of the UCCJEA is to “provide clearer standards for which States can exercise original jurisdiction over a child custody determination. The UCCJEA permits registration of an out of state custody determination. The use of the word may in the statute indicates that registration of the judgment is permissive.

Under the UCCJEA, a court has a duty to recognize and enforce an out-of-state child custody determination if the other state exercised jurisdiction in compliance with the UCCJEA or the determination was made under factual circumstances complying with the jurisdictional standards of the UCCJEA and the determination has not been modified.

Here, Khan argued that every foreign judgment afforded full faith and credit by this state must first have a full evidentiary hearing in order to make the judgment “executory.”  But the former wife in this case was not seeking to execute the Illinois judgment. Thus, the only question before the court was whether the trial court’s finding that the Illinois judgment was entitled to full faith and credit was erroneous.

The former wife successfully proved that a valid judgment was executed in Illinois; thus, res judicata applied to prohibit litigation of the same issues arising out of the same facts.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting full faith and credit to the Illinois judgment.

The appellate opinion is here.

New Article Hague Abduction Convention Not Your Typical Custody Case

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

My new article “The Hague Abduction Convention: Not Your Typical Custody Case”, discusses a problem frequently encountered by lawyers representing parents in international child custody disputes. The problem is parents treating their Hague Abduction Convention case as if it were any other custody case. The article is now available on the KidSide website.

Hague Court

Hague Abduction Convention

The Hague Abduction Convention is the primary mechanism to ensure the return of children who have been wrongfully removed or retained from their country of habitual residence. The two main purposes behind the Convention are to protect children from the harm of an international abduction and secure the left behind parent’s rights of access to their child.

However, many parents confuse the purposes of the Convention, mistakenly thinking their best defense rests on proving what a better parent they are. It comes as a surprise to many people to learn that the judge in a Convention case does not even have jurisdiction to hear their child custody dispute.

But before any defenses are even asserted, a parent seeking a child’s return must first prove their case. To prove a case under the Convention, a Petitioner must demonstrate where the habitual residence of the child was before the wrongful removal; that the removal breached custody rights; and at the time of the child’s removal those rights were actually exercised.

There are a limited number of available defenses under the Hague Abduction Convention, and those defenses are different from a typical child custody case. They are different because the purposes of the Convention are different. Given that courts in a Convention case cannot decide the merits of the custody dispute, typical arguments about the best interest of the child don’t have much traction, leaving a limited number of defenses.

KidSide

Child abduction cases under the Hague Convention have a negative impact on children. Add to that, the growing number of high-conflict court cases, like divorce and domestic violence. Because of the growing number of high-conflict cases, there is always a lack of support for kids caught in the legal system.

That’s where KidSide comes in.

KidSide is a 501(c)3 which supports the Family Court Services Unit of the Miami-Dade County, Florida courthouse – the largest judicial circuit in Florida. KidSide can use your support as it supports Family Court Services.

Together, they have been providing crucial services to children and families for more than 20 years. The Unit assists all judges and general magistrates with some of the Court’s most difficult family cases by providing solution-focused and brief therapeutic interventions.

KidSide helps the Family Court Services Unit provide services for families at no cost in the areas of alienation, child/family assistance, co-parenting, crisis assistance, marital reconciliation, parenting coordination, reunification, time-sharing, supervised visitation, and monitored exchanges.

They are staffed with dedicated professionals who are committed to helping families reduce their level of conflict and provide supportive services for the entire family system with particular sensitivity to children.

You can support KidSide by clicking here.

The Kidside article is here.

The Myth of Cross-Border Asset Protection

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

International Prenup

Is cross-border asset protection a myth? As the world becomes more mobile, issues relating to foreign prenuptial agreements, and the type of marital regime people enter, have taken on greater importance.

Prenuptial agreements are not only becoming more common, but are crossing international borders. The situation in which a couple marries in one country, owns assets in other countries, and live in yet another country, has now become commonplace.

I am honored to be speaking at a webinar on the Myth of Cross-Border Asset Protection on April 5th with Juan Francisco Zarricueta from Santiago Chile, and our two moderators, Vanessa L Hammer of Chicago, and Melissa A. Kucinski, from Washington, D.C.

The Webinar is sponsored by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers and is open to everyone. One hour of CLE is available.

Registration information is available here.

Reducing Divorce Waiting Periods

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

With many countries and U.S. states, having divorce waiting periods, the District of Columbia’s recent legislation, which is reducing its waiting period, is big news. The D.C. Council gave unanimous approval to legislation that eliminated long waiting periods to file for divorce. The waiting period was considered especially harmful to survivors of domestic violence filing for divorce.

divorce waiting period

Waiting in Vain

D.C. law previously allowed a couple to divorce after six months of living separately, only if both parties mutually and voluntarily agreed to it. If a spouse contested the divorce, D.C. law required the couple to remain legally married for a year. Now if one spouse wants a divorce, they can file for one at any time — without any waiting period.

“It made no sense at all that someone might be chained to their abuser or their partner when they didn’t want to be. This was a common sense reform that allows people to move on with their lives and also provide some extra supports for survivors of domestic violence.”

The D.C. Council unanimously approved the bill in November 2023, and the new law took effect last week. The new D.C. law also requires judges to consider domestic violence history, including physical, emotional and financial abuse, when determining alimony or property distribution and it explicitly allows judges to award exclusive use of a family home to either spouse while awaiting litigation.

Florida Divorce Waiting Period

I’ve written about divorce waiting periods, and your rights in divorce before. Like the District of Columbia and other U.S. states, Florida also has a divorce waiting period of sorts. In Florida, no final judgment of dissolution of marriage may be entered until at least 20 days have elapsed from the date of filing the original petition for dissolution of marriage.

 The thinking behind waiting periods in Florida reflects the protective regard Florida holds toward the preservation of marriage and a public policy that marriage is the foundation of home and family.

In some cases the waiting period is longer. For instance, no dissolutions in Florida are allowed in cases of an incapacitated spouse unless the party alleged to be incapacitated has been adjudged incapacitated for a preceding period of at least 3 years. However, the court, on a showing that injustice would result from this delay, may enter a final judgment of dissolution of marriage at an earlier date.

Tired of Waiting

This change to the D.C. law will eliminate one of the many barriers people face when leaving abusive partners. The up-to-one year waiting period, which was established in the 1970s, was considered by many to be outdated and paternalistic.

Half of all states have a waiting period between the filing of divorce papers and when the marriage is legally dissolved, which can range from six months to even longer in some states. But why?

It has long been a recognized public policy by many states that encouraging and preserving the institution of marriage was a societal benefit. These days that notion may seem like an anachronistic legal concept. But the public policy underlying the presumption that marriage is a good institution still exists in many state statutes. Delaying a divorce then, comes from the theory that a couple, if they had more time, could preserve their marriage.

The Washington Post article is here.