Tag: Free speech

Family Law, Free Speech & Insulting a Lawyer

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

In family law cases, courts can issue injunctions that curb your right to free speech, especially if children are involved but maybe not if you are insulting a lawyer. A recent case out of Michigan asks if the trial court can protect a divorce lawyer against threats from a dissatisfied former client.

Speech Restriction Family Law

Chilling Speech

A former husband was placed on probation after pleading no contest to two violations of a domestic violence injunction that prohibited him from contacting his ex-wife. As a condition of his probation, he was barred from engaging in “any assaultive, abusive, threatening, or intimidating behavior.”

While he was out on probation, the former husband violated his probation because of a series of e-mails he sent over the course of a month to his former attorney who represented him in his divorce and the injunction proceeding.

Cruelly, he called his former lawyer a “pussy” and a “negligent piece of shit,” accusing him of “ignor[ing] child abuse” and owing the former husband money, and finished with a: “Fuck you.”

In his later e-mails, he copied various other people, including the county prosecutor, and referred to his former lawyer as a “fraud” and a “twat,” accused him of breaking the law, and even accused the presiding judge of ignoring evidence of child abuse and parental alienation.

Some of the e-mails included photos, such as a photo of the presiding judge and his family at a judicial investiture and another of the former husband’s children, edited to appear as though they were in a jail cell.

The former lawyer reported the emails to the probation officer, who filed a warrant request alleging a technical probation violation for his “threatening/intimidating behavior”. At the probation violation hearing, the former lawyer testified that the e-mails made him fear for his safety.  He also testified about several telephone calls in which he allegedly threatened him, although he could not recall the substance of those threats.

After the presentation of evidence, the former husband argued that the e-mails were constitutionally protected speech.  The trial court disagreed, finding that he intended to threaten and intimidate his former lawyer, and the speech was not protected under the First Amendment because the language in his e-mails constituted fighting words.  He appeals.

Florida Speech Restrictions to Protect Against Violence

I have written about speech, domestic violence in family law cases before. To state a cause of action for protection against domestic violence in Florida, you must allege sufficient facts demonstrating that you are a victim of domestic violence or have reasonable cause to believe you are in imminent danger of becoming a victim. Domestic violence means, in part, any assault, battery, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury of one family or household member by another family or household member.

An injunction against domestic violence requires malicious harassment that consists at the very least of some threat of imminent violence, which excludes mere uncivil behavior that causes distress or annoyance. Fighting words, or words that would tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace could be actionable but it would depend on the circumstances.

Muffled in the Mitten State

On appeal, the former husband complained the trial court violated his First Amendment rights by finding him guilty of a probation violation based on constitutionally protected speech.

Under the Constitution, protected speech under the First Amendment includes expressions or ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or discomforting.” However, the right to speak freely is not absolute.”

States may restrict certain categories of speech that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Here, the trial court erred in concluding that the former husband’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment because it was threatening in nature.

The right to free speech does not extend to “true threats,” which are defined as statements in which “the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.  Excluded from this category are jests, hyperbole, or other statements whose context indicates no real possibility that violence will follow.

To establish a true threat, the State must show that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be viewed as threatening violence. The true-threat exception to the First Amendment encompasses only physical threats, and our Supreme Court explicitly declined to extend the exception to encompass nonphysical threats.

The trial court should have assessed whether the former husband intended to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence against the lawyer or whether the purported threats were physical.

Although his e-mails were offensive and inappropriate, they did not express an intent to commit an act of unlawful physical violence.  Accordingly, his speech did not fall within the true-threat exception to the First Amendment. The emails were also not “fighting words,” personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.

Generally, speech made over the Internet, far removed from any potential violence, is not considered to be inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction. Although the former husband’s language might provoke violence if delivered in person, the fact that it was communicated via e-mail, far removed from any potential violence, renders it unlikely to provoke a violent reaction.

The opinion is here.

Divorce, Family Law and Constitutional Rights

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

Today is September 17th: Constitution Day. For anyone involved in divorce and family law cases, your Constitutional rights are always at risk. In New Jersey that was recently proved when a family judge restrained a woman from posting a video about her husband’s refusal to give her a religious divorce.

Divorce Constitution

Gotta Get a Get

On September 17, 1787, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention met for the last time to sign the document they created. Written 236 years ago, the U.S. Constitution is still the country’s most important legal instrument – even impacting people going through a simple divorce today.

For many Americans, religion plays an important part of finalizing their divorce. All three major monotheistic religions require a religious divorce to remarry within the faith. Without a religious divorce, a second marriage will not be recognized.

Agunot refers to Jewish women who are separated from their husbands but unable to obtain a legal Jewish divorce, leaving them barred from remarriage under Judaism’s adultery laws. One New Jersey woman denied a “Get” – a jewish divorce – decided to take matters into her own hands. She posted a video accusing her estranged husband of improperly withholding a get, and asking community members to “press” her husband to give the get.

After the video was made, the husband obtained a restraining order based on a domestic violence complaint alleging harassment. He testified that he received numerous phone calls from unknown numbers, a photograph of himself identifying him as a “get refuser” and calling on others to “tell him to free his wife.” Additionally, he was adamant that he was not a get refuser.

The trial judge found that the communication was “invasive” of the husband’s privacy, holding:

“one cannot hide behind the First Amendment when that communication is invasive of the recipient’s privacy.”

The trial judge entered a temporary restraining order against the Wife’s video and she appealed.

Florida and Constitutional Rights

I’ve written about the intersection of the U.S. Constitution and divorce cases before. This Constitution Day it is important to understand that family courts have a lot of power which can impact your constitutional rights.

Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Florida Constitution has an express right of privacy clause in it. Florida courts have interpreted the Florida Constitution to afford even greater privacy rights than those in the U.S. Constitution.

Accordingly, Florida courts have to carefully balance a parent’s constitutional right against the state’s interests. When the matter involves religious beliefs, family courts generally do not make decisions in favor of a specific religion over the objection of the other parent. The court should also avoid interference with the right of a parent to practice their own religion and avoid imposing an obligation to enforce the religious beliefs of the other parent.

First Amendment Gets Going

On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division held that the wife’s video was constitutionally protected speech. The appellate court vacated the temporary restraining order holding: a “general history” of violence was insufficient to vitiate First Amendment protections.

The video, whether viewed on its own or in the context in which it was disseminated, does not fall outside the First Amendment’s protection. Recall that the trial judge had concluded that the video was not protected by the First Amendment because members of the Jewish community would respond violently to plaintiff being identified as a get refuser.

However, the trial judge’s reliance on an unspecified general history of violent treatment to which get refusers were subjected was insufficient to render the wife’s video a true threat or an imminent danger to satisfy the incitement requirement.

To qualify as incitement and lose First Amendment protection a communication must be both “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such action.”

The New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division opinion is here.

Free Speech and Child Custody in Massachusetts

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

Free speech and child custody are in the news as people discover they can’t say a lot of things after their child custody battle ends. A recent Massachusetts appeals court just decided whether some typical child custody order restrictions violated free speech laws.

custody free speech

Chilling Speech

In a Massachusetts court, a Father filed a complaint for custody, support and parenting time, seeking custody of the parties’ child. The Mother counterclaimed and a temporary custody order was entered.

A few months later, the family judge entered its own temporary order relating to exchanges of the child, telephone calls and exchanging addresses. After the final hearing, the court ordered joint legal custody and nearly equal timesharing for both parents.

The order also contained numerous restrictions on both parents’ speech. Although the court’s order appears to have the best interest of the child at heart, prior restraints on speech are very serious constitutional violations.

The order restrained the parents from making any disparaging or negative comments of any type of nature whatsoever to one another by telephone, text or email or to any other third person, to include the child and/or disparaging comments relative to one another electronic social media. The order also prohibited the parents from discussing legal proceedings with the child.

Florida Child Custody and Speech Restrictions

I’ve written about free speech in family cases before. Family courts have a lot of power to protect children. Florida courts have to balance a parent’s right of free expression against the state’s parens patriae interest in assuring the well-being of minor children.

In Florida, there have been cases in which a judge prohibited a parent from speaking Spanish to a child. A mother went from primary caregiver to only supervised visits – under the nose of a time-sharing supervisor. The trial judge also allowed her daily telephone calls with her daughter, supervised by the Father.

The Mother was Venezuelan, and because the Father did not speak Spanish, the court ordered:

“Under no circumstances shall the Mother speak Spanish to the child.”

The judge was concerned about the Mother’s comments, after the Mother “whisked” the child away from the time-sharing supervisor in an earlier incident and had a “private” conversation with her in a public bathroom. The Mother was also bipolar and convicted of two crimes.

The appeals court reversed the restriction. Ordering a parent not to speak Spanish violates the freedom of speech and right to privacy.

Florida law tries to balance the burden placed on the right of free expression essential to the furtherance of the state’s interests in promoting the best interests of children. In other words, in that balancing act, the best interests of children can be a compelling state interest justifying a restraint of a parent’s right of free speech.

Stirring the Constitutional Speech Beanpot

The appellate court in Massachusetts reversed the speech restrictions because a number of – fairly typical speech provisions for a child custody order – placed an impermissible restraint on the mother’s speech and interfered in her child rearing.

The court found the family judge failed to provide specific findings to justify a compelling State interest in placing restrictions on the mother, or to explain why the limitations were necessary to protect the compelling interest.

Prior restraints are “extraordinary remedies,” and are “permissible only where the harm expected from the unrestrained speech is grave, the likelihood of the harm occurring without the prior restraint in place is all but certain, and there are no alternative, less restrictive means to mitigate the harm.”

A prior restraint will not be upheld unless it is “justified by a compelling State interest to protect against a serious threat of harm,” and the limitation on speech is “no greater than is necessary to protect the compelling interest that is asserted as a justification for the restraint.”

Although the judge clearly was attempting to reduce future conflict between the parties in fashioning the judgment as he did, he failed to provide specific findings justifying the State’s interests in the restraints imposed; instead he simply stated that the orders were made in “the best interest of the … child,” which alone is not enough to justify a prior restraint on speech.

The Massachusetts appellate opinion is here.

 

Free Speech and Domestic Violence

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

In family law, when a cyberstalking complaint consists of social media posts, free speech and domestic violence can clash. In a recent case, a domestic violence court prohibited one Florida lawyer’s social media comments about the other lawyers in her case.

Cyberstalking

Injunction Junction

Florida lawyer Ashley Krapacs filed a petition for a domestic violence injunction against her ex-boyfriend and represented herself at the DV hearing. Attorney Russel J. Williams represented her Ex.

After Krapac lost the hearing, on jurisdictional grounds, she wrote an article about the opposing lawyer, saying that he lied to the judge on the record during these proceedings. As a result, Williams hired his own attorney, Nisha Bacchus, to sue Krapacs for defamation.

Krapacs responded by writing several social media posts disparaging the new lawyer, Bacchus, with personal insults for representing Williams in the defamation suit against her.

Then Krapacs created a blog post which claimed Bacchus filed a frivolous lawsuit against her, accused her of being a bully, and included a vulgar insult. She tagged Bacchus in more posts and hurled insults at Bacchus and her law firm and identified the car Bacchus drove.

In one of her final Facebook posts, Krapacs stated she was going to connect with Bacchus’s former clients to sue her for malpractice. Bacchus sought to stop this by filing a petition for an injunction, alleging Krapacs was cyberstalking her.

The DV judge entered the injunction and limited Krapacs’ use of her office space since both Krapacs and Bacchus had offices in the same building. The judge also prohibited Krapacs from posting on social media about Bacchus and ordered her to take down all the offending posts about Bacchus.

Krapacs appealed.

Family Law and Free Speech

I’ve written about free speech in family law before. Family courts have a lot of power to protect children, and that can involve restraints on free speech. Speech can be enjoined under our domestic violence laws.

Domestic violence injunctions prohibiting free speech are subject to constitutional challenge because they put the government’s weight behind that prohibition: a judge orders it, and the police enforce it.

Florida, the term “domestic violence” has a very specific meaning, and it is more inclusive than most people realize. It means any assault, aggravated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury or death of one family or household member by another family or household member.

Domestic violence can also mean cyberstalking. Cyberstalking is harassment via electronic communications. A person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person and makes a credible threat to that person commits the offense of aggravated stalking, a felony of the third degree.

A credible threat means a verbal or nonverbal threat, or a combination of the two, including threats delivered by electronic communication or implied by a pattern of conduct, which places the person who is the target of the threat in reasonable fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her family members or individuals closely associated with the person, and which is made with the apparent ability to carry out the threat to cause such harm.

Cyberstalking and Free Speech

The appellate court felt Krapacs’ actions did not qualify as cyberstalking because they did not constitute a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over time evidencing a continuity of purpose.

Retagging in social media posts for four hours constituted, in the court’s view, one instance of qualifying conduct under the statute. The other acts Bacchus complained of were deemed to be constitutionally protected and did not qualify as additional instances of repeated stalking.

The court also found that the injunction prohibiting Krapacs “from posting Nisha Bacchus, Nisha Elizabeth Bacchus or any part thereof, on any social media or internet websites, and requiring her to take down all social media and internet posts that reference Nisha Bacchus was overbroad.

While the appellate court held that her comments could not be subject to an injunction, it did find that Krapacs was not immune from civil liability for her actions and could face money damages.

Then there’s the Florida Bar, which then filed an emergency suspension petition against Krapacs. The Bar viewed her social media tweets, posts and comments as arising out of the opposing lawyers’ representation of clients who were litigating against her.

The Bar called Krapacs strategy “terrorist legal tactics” and felt it was prejudicial to the administration of justice.

After a hearing, the referee recommended a two-year suspension from the Florida Bar. The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the case, disapproved of the two-year suspension, and instead disbarred her.

The opinion is here.