Tag: family law international

Fighting Paternity and UCCJEA Jurisdiction

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

A husband and wife, who marry in Brazil, agree the husband does not have paternity and is not the legal father of their daughter. But that does not stop them from fighting UCCJEA jurisdiction in Florida. What happens when the court disagrees with them that he’s not the Father? A married couple just found out the results in an interesting international child custody case.

UCCJEA Paternity

The Girl from Ipanema

The Wife is a Brazilian citizen living in Rio de Janeiro not far from the famous beach. The Husband is a U.S. citizen, a commercial airline pilot, and resides in Florida. The parties met online in 2014. They later were married in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 2016.

The wife had a daughter born in Brazil in 2015, the year before they got married. Interestingly, while the wife acknowledged she was the biological mother, the parties stipulated that the husband was not the biological father.

However, the Husband added his last name to the child’s name on the child’s birth certificate in Brazil. Later, they went to the U.S. Consulate in Brazil, and had a Consular Report of Birth Abroad Certificate issued for the child using his citizenship and his last name for the child.

Next, they had issued a U.S. passport and a Brazilian passport for the child using his last name as the father as well. It was later found that the husband held himself out as the father of his daughter during the marriage. The parties owned one marital asset, a home in Naples, Florida.

In 2021, the Husband filed a petition for divorce in Florida seeking only the following relief: (1) a dissolution of marriage and (2) and equitable distribution of the home in Naples. The Wife filed an answer denying allegations but did not raise the issue of the child, custody, or child support.

During the case, the parties entered a partial marital settlement agreement resolving all of the financial issues, including equitable distribution of the home. However, nothing was agreed, or mentioned, about their daughter.

Instead, the parties filed a stipulation that the husband was not the father of the child. Additionally, the husband filed an objection before trial that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear child support and custody under the UCCJEA because Florida was not the home state of the child.

The family judge entered a amended final judgment finding that the husband was the legal father of the child, and reserved jurisdiction on child support.

The Husband filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that under the UCCJEA, a court in Florida has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if Florida is the home state of the child or was the home state of the child within 6 months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent continues to live in Florida. The court denied the motion for reconsideration and the husband appealed.

Florida UCCJEA

I have written about international child custody issues before. The UCCJEA is a uniform act drafted to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with other state courts in child custody matters; promote cooperation with other courts; ensure that a custody decree is rendered in the state which enjoys the superior position to decide what is in the best interest of the child; deter controversies and avoid re-litigation of custody issues; facilitate enforcement of custody decrees; and promote uniformity of the laws governing custody issues.

An important aspect of the UCCJEA is that it only covers child custody determinations. Under the UCCJEA, a “child custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, residential care, or visitation with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order. The definition does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual.

The UCCJEA deals with “child custody proceedings,” which are defined as proceedings in which legal custody, physical custody, residential care, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. Child Custody proceedings do not include proceedings involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement.

Although not part of the UCCJEA, under Florida law, the husband could have also faced additional challenges. For instance, if a mother of any child born out of wedlock and the reputed father intermarry, the child is deemed and held to be the child of the husband and wife, as though born within wedlock.

Boa Sorte

On appeal, the third district affirmed that the husband was the legal father of their daughter. The court noted that the UCCJEA was a jurisdictional act which controls custody disputes and only applies where custody is at issue.

The term custody includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear.

But, a child custody determination does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual. In this case, the appellate court found that the parties did not dispute custody of the minor child. As a result, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action.

The opinion is here.

Travel Restrictions to Hague Convention Countries

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

A recurring international custody problem is should a court place travel restrictions on parents who want to travel internationally to only travel to Hague Convention countries with the children? A married couple from China finds out the extent to which a family court can place such travel restrictions.

Travel Restrictions

China Visit

Zhenzhen Wang (the Wife) and Shengyi Ye (the Husband) were married in Iowa in 2008.  They share two children—a son and a daughter. In 2019, Shengyi took a job as a professor in China, while Zhenzhen and the children remained in Iowa.

In 2022, the wife and children visited the husband in China. One day while driving in the car, the parents started fighting, which resulted in the husband abandoning the wife and the children on the side of the road.  She took a taxi back to his apartment, where she discovered he had removed the children’s passports, travel documents, and birth certificates from her backpack.

Although he at first denied taking the documents, he later refused to give them back, preventing her and the children from leaving the country. It ultimately took Zhenzhen “six or seven months” to reorder all of the travel documents and return to Iowa.

When the wife and children returned home to Iowa, she petitioned to dissolve the marriage. Shengyi then filed a competing lawsuit in China, which was ultimately dismissed.

The Iowa court awarded her sole legal custody of the children. After considering his prior conduct preventing the children from returning to home to the U.S., and that China may not enforce a United States custodial order, the court required that the father have visitation with the children only in the U.S.

The court also provided him up to ten consecutive weeks of visitation with the children over the summer, and up to four weeks at a time should he travel to the United States during the school year. The husband appealed, arguing that he should be able to take the children to China for visitation.

Florida and the Hague Convention

I often speak and write about the Hague Abduction Convention and international child custody issues. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act is the statute in the United States that implements the Hague Abduction Convention.

Under the Act, a person may petition a court authorized to exercise jurisdiction in the country where a child is located for the return of the child to his or her habitual residence in another signatory country, so the underlying child custody dispute can be determined in the proper jurisdiction.

But it is important to know that the Convention applies as between contracting states only to wrongful removals or retentions occurring after its entry into force in those states. The accession will have effect only as regards the relations between the acceding State and such Contracting States as will have declared their acceptance of the accession.

In plain language, the Convention enters into force between an acceding State and a member Contracting State only when the Contracting State accepts the acceding State’s accession to the Convention.

Appellate Decision

The appellate court noted that limiting a parent’s ability to travel internationally with his or her children implicates heightened, and at times conflicting, interests. On the one hand, despite the virtues of our state, the court noted:

“[t]he world does not end at the borders of Iowa.”

Children should not easily be denied the opportunity to build meaningful relationships with a parent who resides outside of the United States or fully experience their dual heritage. On the other hand, there may be problems securing the return from a foreign country of a child to a custodial parent in the United States.

The danger of retention of a child in a country where retrieving the child is difficult, if not impossible, is a major factor for a court to weigh. Courts also consider other factors, such as the parent’s domicile, the reasons for visiting, the children’s safety, the age of the children, the parents’ relationship, the viability of bonds or other return measures, and the character and integrity of the parent seeking out-of-country visitation as gleaned from past comments and conduct.

The Iowa Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed. The appeals court noted that China is not a party to the Hague Convention, so the mother would have no recourse should the husband refuse to return the children to the United States.

The Court of Appeals of Iowa decision is here.

Establishing Foreign Paternity under UIFSA

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

A common family law issue involves UIFSA, in that a U.S. state can establish a child support order after proving the paternity of the father over a foreign born child. However, proof is required beyond mere admissions and agreement. Is being named on the birth certificate enough? One couple recently found out.

UIFSA Parentage

Love in Lansing

The Plaintiff lives in Brazil and is the mother of LCK, who was born in Brazil in late 2020. The purported father, who was the Defendant in the case, lives in Michigan. The case was heard in a town between Detroit and Lansing. Plaintiff contended that defendant is the father of LCK, arising out of a relationship between the parties in Michigan in January 2020.

Defendant did not deny that the parties had a relationship during that time. In August 2021, plaintiff sought child support from defendant under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), by filing an Application for Establishment of a Decision with the central authority in Brazil.

The application stated that defendant’s paternity of the child was “established or presumed,” and was supported by a Brazil birth certificate naming defendant as the child’s father.

The Livingston County Prosecutor initiated this action under UIFSA, filing the Application as a complaint.  Defendant responded, denying paternity and requesting that the child’s paternity be established.  Defendant also filed a -separate paternity action in the trial court.

In contrast to his denial of paternity in the child support case, defendant alleged in his paternity action that he is the father of LCK. In fact, the defendant earlier claimed he was the LCK’s father in the paternity action, and even signed an affidavit before the U.S. Consulate stating that he was the father.

However, in the international child support action under the UIFSA, he disputed his paternity of the child had been established under Brazil law. Plaintiff contended that defendant’s name on the child’s birth certificate established his paternity under Brazil law, precluding further inquiry into the child’s parentage under the UIFSA. Defendant disagreed, and asked the trial court to resolve the paternity action before determining the child support action. Plaintiff filed a motion to establish support, arguing without explanation that the birth certificate alone established defendant’s paternity of the child under Brazil law.

Plaintiff also asserted that while briefly visiting Brazil, defendant signed an acknowledgment of paternity at the United States Consulate to obtain a passport for the child, and sued plaintiff under the Hague Convention for abduction of the child.

Defendant did not respond to the motion, but at the hearing requested a determination of paternity under Michigan law. The trial court entered a Uniform Child Support Final Order on the basis that defendant had been established as the child’s father under Brazil law, and ordered defendant to pay plaintiff monthly child support of $1,567. The father appealed.

Florida UIFSA

I have written on international custody and support issues before. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act is one of the uniform acts drafted by the Uniform Law Commission. First developed in 1992, UIFSA resolves interstate jurisdictional disputes about which states can properly establish and modify child support and spousal support orders.

The UIFSA also controls the issue of enforcement of family support obligations within the United States. In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, which required all U.S. states adopt UIFSA, or face loss of federal funding for child support enforcement. Every U.S. state has adopted some version of UIFSA to resolve interstate disputes about support.

One of the more important purposes of UIFSA is to extend enforcement to foreign support orders. A court in Florida, for example, must apply UIFSA to any support proceeding involving a foreign support order from a foreign tribunal. A “foreign tribunal” means a court, administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity of a foreign country which is authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support orders or to determine parentage of a child.

Spartan Findings

On appeal, the Defendant contended the trial court erred by determining his parentage of the child had been determined under Brazil law without permitting him to challenge the parentage of the child.

A trial court can establish child support under UIFSA only upon finding, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, that defendant had a duty of support based on the putative father’s paternity. In doing so, the trial court was obligated to apply the procedural and substantive law of Michigan.

In determining Defendant was the father based on the Brazilian birth certificate, the trial court accepted plaintiff’s contention under Brazil law, any man designated as the father on a child’s birth certificate is thereby determined by law to be the father of that child, and that defendant therefore was precluded from raising the defense of non-parentage.

However, the trial court accepted the contention that parentage had been established under Brazil law without any proof and without any authority to support plaintiff’s assertion.

Plaintiff also argued that she established paternity because of Defendant’s past claims that he was the child’s father in the paternity action, and that he even signed an affidavit before the U.S. Consulate stating that he was the child’s father.

But on appeal, the question was whether the was precluded from challenging the child’s parentage by virtue of a previous legal determination in Brazil or elsewhere.  Defendant’s past assertions of parentage are not relevant to this narrow inquiry.

Even though defendant consistently sought to establish the parentage of the child, he never conceded the issue had been determined under Brazil law.  The trial court’s reliance on plaintiff’s unsupported assertion that the birth certificate naming defendant as the father constituted a determination of parentage under Brazil law, was insufficient.

The trial court’s order was vacated, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in which plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant’s parentage of the child has been determined under Brazilian law.

The Michigan Court of Appeals opinion is here.

Divorce Ignorance

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

A new report by two law professors in England is showing a great deal about the public’s ignorance of divorce laws. Overall, the public’s understanding about finance and property on divorce was considered poor. However, those fortunate enough to have consulted lawyers previously were considered knowledgeable.

London divorce town

Keeping calm and carrying on

The legal experts say that thousands of people going through their divorces could be losing out due to “do it yourself” divorces. The professors from the University of Bristol authored a new report where 20,000 members of the public in England and Wales answered questions on divorce-related laws about dividing finances and property.

For example, given 10 statements about the law and asked to say whether each was true or false, the public correctly identified an average of 4.5 statements. In fact, just over half (55 per cent) of the public correctly identified at least half of the statements.

Statements Which Are Not True (in England):

  • The law says that all assets and debts should be split 50:50, regardless of whose name they were in during the marriage
  • Legally, an individual is not entitled to a share of their ex-spouse’s pension
    The law says that if an individual contributed more money during the marriage, then they are usually entitled to more than 50 per cent of the assets

Interestingly, people with higher qualifications or incomes were somewhat more likely than those with lower level qualifications or incomes to know what the law was in relation to financial remedies on divorce.

Florida Divorce

The official term for divorce in Florida is “dissolution of marriage”, and you don’t need fault as a ground for divorce. Florida abolished fault as a ground for divorce. I’ve written about divorce issues before. The no-fault concept in Florida means you no longer have to prove a reason for the divorce, like your spouse’s political views. Instead, you just need to state under oath that your marriage is “irretrievably broken”.

Before the no-fault divorce era, people who wanted to get divorce either had to reach agreement in advance with the other spouse that the marriage was over, or throw mud at each other and prove wrongdoing like adultery or abuse.

No-fault laws were the result of trying to change the way divorces played out in court. No fault laws have reduced the number of feuding couples who felt the need to resort to distorted facts, lies, and the need to focus the trial on who did what to whom.

Florida abolished fault as grounds for filing a divorce. The only ground you need to file for divorce in Florida is to prove your marriage is “irretrievably broken.” Additionally, the mental incapacity of one of the parties, where the party was adjudged incapacitated for the prior three year, is another avenue.

Dodgy Results?

The report also showed that women were more likely to know about aspects of the law relevant to having children, and men to know somewhat more about the law around the division of assets.

Additionally, and not surprisingly, divorcees were somewhat more knowledgeable about the law than others. But still, their percentages appear to be mere guesswork: they identified an average of 5.2 statements correctly compared to 4.4 statements among those who had not been through a divorce. However, the differences between divorcees and others were not large, with levels of misconception still high among divorcees.

Having a lawyer was important to knowing your rights. Among divorcees who had divorced in the previous five years: those who had used more formal routes to reaching an arrangement, or consulted or used a lawyer, tended to know more about the laws around finances on divorce than those who had not.

Those with higher levels of assets to divide on divorce tended to have a greater understanding than those with lower levels or no assets. Divorcees with dependent children were more knowledgeable than other divorcees in relation to the law around the legal position of parents with main care of their children and around the child maintenance formula, although there were still high levels of misunderstanding among parents on these issues.

With do it yourself divorces, when couples settle how to split finances without courts, the law allows them to agree any split they want. More people are now coming up with their “own solutions” surrounding divorce settlements as there is no longer legal aid in England and Wales. The findings highlighted that women had a greater understanding around law relating to children, whilst men were more likely to know the law on assets.

The professor said the lack of legal aid leads to less awareness and knowledge which is “potentially problematic” because it means that people are relying on “their own misunderstanding of the law which tends to lead to poor settlements”.

The majority of the divorcing population in England and Wales reach arrangements relating to their finances and property outside of the formal family justice system, and also that one in five divorcees seek advice and support from family and friends during the divorce process.

For these reasons, it is important to know what level of knowledge people have, and whether there are misconceptions which might be influencing the decisions made by divorcees and the advice family and friends provide.

The BBC article is here.

International Child Custody and Hague Convention

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

A frequent international child custody issue involves the Hague Child Abduction Convention. Return of abducted children to their habitual residence is required unless defenses are established, in which case ameliorative measures can be considered. Is that also true in a war zone? A court in Montana just decided that question.

Hague Convention2

Home on the Range?

The parents are Ukrainians. They married in the Ukraine and lived in the city of Odessa, Ukraine in an apartment. In February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine. The parties began to hear explosions and air raid sirens in Odessa based on Russian aerial attacks, and they were forced to sleep in their basement at times.

In August 2023, the father arranged for the mother and their child to stay with family friends in Moldova due to the increased bombing of Odessa. On August 26, 2023, the mother informed the father that she was intending to fly to Montana with the child to be with her mother and sister.

The father began to take steps to secure the return of the child to the Ukraine by filing a Hague application and filing a return petition in Montana.

Florida Hague Convention

I will be speaking about the Hague Convention and international child custody issues at the prestigious Marital & Family Law Review Course in Orlando later this month. The event is co-sponsored by the Florida Bar Family Law Section and the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.

What happens if your children are wrongfully abducted or retained overseas? If that happens, you must become familiar with the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, also known as The Hague Convention. This international treaty exists to protect children from international abductions by requiring the prompt return to their habitual residence.

The Hague Convention applies only in jurisdictions that have signed the convention, and its reach is limited to children ages 16 and under. Essentially, The Hague Convention helps families more quickly revert back to the “status quo” child custody arrangement before an unlawful child abduction.

If your children are wrongfully taken out of the country or wrongfully retained after the time for returning them passed, the Hague Convention can help you get them back.

A Mess in Odessa

At the trial in Montana, it was not disputed that the father established a prima facie case under the Convention. However, the mother argued return to Ukraine would expose the child to a “grave risk” of physical or psychological harm.

The district judge noted that the conflict in Ukraine did not, by itself, trigger the grave risk exception because it’s not sufficient to simply find that because the country is at war, children cannot be returned․

Instead, the focus should be on the risk a child would face in the part of the county she will return to and whether that will imperil her unacceptably. For example, some courts have found that return to certain cities or eastern Ukraine poses a grave risk.

Additionally, the fact that a child has grown accustomed to life in the U.S. was not a valid concern under the grave risk exception, as it is the abduction that causes the pangs of subsequent return. Also, the exception does not provide a license for a court in the abducted-to country to speculate on where the child would be happiest or who would be the better parent. And grave risk does not encompass a home where money is in short supply, or where educational or other opportunities are more limited. Even if a “grave risk” is shown, a court has “the discretion to consider ameliorative measures that could ensure the child’s safe return.

Here, the court found that return to a different city in the Ukraine, Chernivtsi, a city and oblast in southwestern Ukraine was at less risk than the eastern portion of the country such as Odessa. It was also noted that many Ukrainians had relocated to the western part of the country since the invasion.

The Mother’s argument that her voluntary parole status in the United States should be considered. However, to the extent the mother faced a Hobson’s choice, it is a dilemma of her own making. The record showed that the father was willing to allow her and the child to reside outside of Ukraine, but close enough for contact, while custody was determined.

Instead the Mother chose to come to the United States, as opposed to Moldova or another neighboring country, for the undisputed reason that her family was here. Neither the Convention nor this Court’s decision are constrained by that choice.

Based on those facts the court ordered the return of the Child to Chernivtsi, Ukraine and awarded fees and costs.

The order is here.

Registration for the certification review course is here (if available)

Hague Convention and the Mature Child Exception

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

A  common international custody issue under the Hague Convention involves a wrongfully removed child when there is an exception to being returned home. One such exception is the mature child exception. How mature does a child have to be in order to avoid being returned to the child’s habitual residence? A recent Florida case analyzes that question.

Hague Mature Child 2

Oh Mexico

The Father and Mother are the parents of a child born in Mexico in 2013. They lived together in Mexico until approximately one year after the child was born. After their separation, a Mexican court granted custodial rights and child support obligations. The custody order also contained a clause which prohibited Mother from removing minor child from Mexico without Father’s consent.

Then in December 2022, the Mother abducted the child to the United States. After learning his child was abducted, the Father filed a return petition under the Hague Convention in Florida.

The Mother opposed returning the child by arguing that the child was “sufficiently mature and intelligent to object to being repatriated to Mexico.” The trial court conducted an in-camera interview with the child who was then ten years old and had been exclusively with Mother in Florida for over a year. The child testified she lived in an apartment with Mother and her little brother and was attending school and taking English classes. She enjoyed playing at parks and wanted to join a football team.

She also admitted seeing Mother crying and being told by Mother that Father wanted minor child to go back to Mexico and that “I’m afraid that you might be sending me back to Mexico and that I won’t be able to see my mom.” The Mother testified she not only told minor child about the proceedings, but also told her she feared minor child “would be taken back to Mexico and no longer be with me.”

The trial judge denied the Hague return petition after applying the mature child exception. The father appealed.

Hague Convention

I have written and spoken on international custody and child abduction cases under the Hague Convention. The Convention’s mission is basic: to return children to their country of habitual residence.

In the recent Mexican case, the father had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the child was a habitual resident of Mexico immediately before her abduction, the removal was in breach of his custody rights under Mexican law, and he was actually exercising rights of custody, or would have been so exercised but for the removal. If so, the child must be promptly returned to Mexico unless there is an exception to return.

The key inquiry in this recent case was the mature child exception. A court may refuse to order the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is ap­propriate to take account of its views. A court may find that the child’s objection in and of itself is conclusive—it does not have to be coupled with another defense to be sustained.

Talking ’bout Mexico

On appeal, the district court noted that the child was exceptionally bright and articulate, she calmly and clearly conveyed her reluctance to return to Mexico, and conveyed significant family ties, teachers, and friends in Florida.

But in determining whether the mature child exception applies, courts primarily consider whether the child is sufficiently mature, has a particularized objection to being returned and whether the objection is the product of undue influence.

Here, the ten-year-old child’s preference to remain with Mother in Florida was based primarily on: friends, a desire to attend high school, and an upcoming school trip to Orlando. The appellate court found these to be generic and near-sighted responses and demonstrated the child’s inability to maturely comprehend or appreciate the long-term impact of her decisions.

This was especially true considering the child provided no significant testimony as to her life in Mexico or how life in Mexico differed from life in the United States. Also, her fear of return was based solely on not wanting to be separated from her Mother and return to Mexico does not necessarily mean she will be separated from Mother as Mother is free to return with her to Mexico.

Importantly, only a child’s objection is sufficient to trump the Convention’s strong presumption in favor of return, not the child’s mere preference. Here, the child just didn’t want to be separated from her mom. The only fear of returning to Mexico was being separated from Mother and not an unwillingness to live in Mexico.

Finally, the child’s objection was clearly the product of Mother’s undue influence. For example the Mother admitted she told minor child about the legal proceedings and about her fears of minor child being returned to Mexico.

The court reversed and remanded for the trial court to grant return to Mexico.

The opinion is here.

Exclusivity and International Child Support Orders

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

In the Unites States, once a court of a state has entered a child custody or child support order, the state keeps control of the custody and child support matter unless specific things happen. This exclusivity is true in international child support orders and recently came into play in a case starting in Australia.

Foreign Child Support

A Blunder Down Under?

In 2010, an Australian court awarded two parents equal timesharing of their daughter and incorporated their binding child support agreement. But then in 2018, the Australian court entered another consent order. The parents agreed that the Mother and their daughter could relocate permanently to the United States.

As part of their agreement, the court ordered a long-distance timesharing schedule and added their previous 2018 Child Support Order which provided:

The parents agree to terminate their child support agreement requiring the Father to pay support while the daughter remained in the U.S.

The Father stayed in Australia and the Mother and daughter moved to North Carolina. Soon after, Mother and daughter moved to Florida. This time, they relocated without providing Father with their new address, preventing him from exercising his timesharing rights and contact with their daughter. The Father filed an action in Florida seeking to register and enforce their Australian timesharing order under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.

The Mother filed her own petition asking the Florida court to modify timesharing and child support because the Father had not exercised his timesharing rights, resulting in increased timesharing on her part. The Father moved to dismiss her modification petition, arguing that the Australian court had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. The trial court allowed Mother to file an amended petition and denied Father’s motion to dismiss. The Father then petitioned for a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over Mother’s petition to modify the Australian support order.

Florida and Exclusive Jurisdiction

I have written on international custody and support issues before. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act is one of the uniform acts drafted by the Uniform Law Commission. First developed in 1992, UIFSA resolves interstate jurisdictional disputes about which states can properly establish and modify child support and spousal support orders.

The UIFSA also controls the issue of enforcement of family support obligations within the United States. In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, which required all U.S. states adopt UIFSA, or face loss of federal funding for child support enforcement. Every U.S. state has adopted some version of UIFSA to resolve interstate disputes about support.

One of the more important purposes of UIFSA is to determine the “controlling” order in the event of multiple orders being entered in multiple states and countries. What distinguishes UIFSA is that all states will be enforcing the same amount because there is only one controlling order. Another important feature is that UIFSA adopted a concept that there should be only one court with the exclusive jurisdiction to modify a current support order. The UIFSA uses the term continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.

Back to the Billabong

On appeal, the district court ruled that under UIFSA, Florida courts may modify foreign orders only when a foreign country lacks or refuses jurisdiction to modify its child support order pursuant to its laws or lacked or refused jurisdiction.

In this case, the Mother never alleged that Australia lacked jurisdiction or refused to modify nor did she seek modification in Australia. Because Australia did not lack jurisdiction or refuse to exercise jurisdiction to modify support, the Florida court could not exercise jurisdiction under UIFSA to modify the Australian child support order.

Additionally, the court noted that the Father never waived his objection to the Florida court’s jurisdiction to modify the Australian child support order. Because the Australian court has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its support order, the Florida court lacked jurisdiction over Mother’s petition to modify child support. The appellate court granted prohibition, and the case was remanded with directions to grant Father’s motion to dismiss Mother’s petition to modify the foreign child support order.

The decision is available here.

Islamic Triple Talaq Divorce and the UCCJEA

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

Under Islamic law a husband can get a divorce pretty easily. It’s called the “triple talaq” and involves merely saying the word “talaq” three times. Will enforcement of the triple talaq in the U.S. under the UCCJEA be enforced? A married couple from India is battling the triple talaq divorce in Louisiana.

Triple Talaq UCCJEA

No Place Like Home

Khan and Azeez are citizens of, and were married in, India. However, they moved and have been residing in the United States since 2007.  They have two children. When they traveled to India in 2018, Khan deserted his wife and took her passport. He was granted a divorce under Islamic law by saying the word “talaq” (divorce) three times. However, triple talaq divorces were declared illegal and unconstitutional in India in 2019. This was made retroactive to 2018 under the Muslim Women Protection of Rights on Marriage Act.

When Azeez eventually got a new passport and was able to return to the United States in 2019, she immediately filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Illinois. In his answer, Khan objected to the Illinois family court taking jurisdiction over his case because he was already divorced in India by saying “talaq” three times.

The Illinois trial court denied Khan’s exception under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, and basic principles of human rights. The trial court held that the divorce by talaq and any subsequent child custody determinations were invalid.

In 2019, the Illinois court rendered a judgment finding the India divorce judgment based on triple talaq was invalid. The Illinois court dissolved the marriage, set child custody, and awarded spousal and child support under Illinois law.

Then in 2023, Khan filed a petition in Louisiana seeking to have his Indian divorce judgment recognized under Louisiana law. Azeez filed an exception of res judicata. The Louisiana trial court granted Azeez’s exception and dismissed Khan’s claims and Khan appealed.

Florida and the UCCJEA

I have written about the UCCJEA and the issues of religion and divorce before. The UCCJEA is a uniform act created to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with other courts in child custody matters.

The UCCJEA also promotes cooperation with other courts and ensures that a custody decree is rendered in the state which is in a superior position to decide the best interest of the child.

The UCCJEA helps to facilitate enforcement of custody decrees – even when the custody decrees come from a foreign country – and has the aspirational goal of promoting uniformity of the laws governing custody issues. Under the UCCJEA, a foreign country should be treated as a US state for the purposes of applying the UCCJEA.

However, a U.S. court does need not always recognize a foreign country’s order under the UCCJEA. For example, if the child custody law of a foreign country violates fundamental principles of human rights, the foreign final judgment may not be recognized here.

Triple Talaq Trouble

Khan argued on appeal that the Illinois proceeding was never made executory, and the divorce decree admitted into evidence by the Louisiana court was incompetent and inadmissible evidence because it was not admitted via an ordinary proceeding which would allow Khan to present evidence.

Generally, foreign judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in Louisiana. In fact, courts in the U.S. are required to give full faith and credit to judgments of courts of other states under the U.S. Constitution. The UCCJEA is applicable to foreign judgments, and sets forth specific rules regarding the recognition, modification, and enforcement of child custody determinations. The statute applies to international cases as well as domestic cases.

The purpose of the UCCJEA is to “provide clearer standards for which States can exercise original jurisdiction over a child custody determination. The UCCJEA permits registration of an out of state custody determination. The use of the word may in the statute indicates that registration of the judgment is permissive.

Under the UCCJEA, a court has a duty to recognize and enforce an out-of-state child custody determination if the other state exercised jurisdiction in compliance with the UCCJEA or the determination was made under factual circumstances complying with the jurisdictional standards of the UCCJEA and the determination has not been modified.

Here, Khan argued that every foreign judgment afforded full faith and credit by this state must first have a full evidentiary hearing in order to make the judgment “executory.”  But the former wife in this case was not seeking to execute the Illinois judgment. Thus, the only question before the court was whether the trial court’s finding that the Illinois judgment was entitled to full faith and credit was erroneous.

The former wife successfully proved that a valid judgment was executed in Illinois; thus, res judicata applied to prohibit litigation of the same issues arising out of the same facts.  Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting full faith and credit to the Illinois judgment.

The appellate opinion is here.

Recognizing International Divorce Decrees

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

A recent Texas case resolves an important dispute over recognizing international divorce decrees. A couple filed for divorce in Texas. Then, the husband traveled to his home country of Pakistan for a ‘quicky’ divorce. Does the Texas court have to honor the international divorce decree?

International Divorce

Longhorns in Lahore

The parties were married in Pakistan in 2009 and later moved to Texas. Husband filed an original petition for divorce in Dallas County district court in 2021. He asked for a divorce, the division of their property, and for the court to decide child custody.

Eight months later, Husband filed a “Notice of Filing of Foreign Judgment.”  He attached a “Divorce Registration Certificate” that was issued in 2022 by the Union Council in his home town of Lahore, Pakistan.

The Pakistani certificate lists addresses in Lahore for both parties. The Husband asked the Texas court to recognize the Pakistani divorce decree, and he also amended his divorce petition. He dropped his demand for a divorce as they were divorced now in Pakistan.

But the Pakistani divorce decree did not “dispose of the parties’ marital interest in various assets” or decide custody so he asked Texas to decide those issues. The Wife objected to recognizing the foreign judgment.

In 2023, after a hearing, the Texas family court sustained Wife’s objection to the recognition of the Pakistani decree, and rendered a final decree of divorce on June 7, 2023. The Husband appealed.

Florida Comity and International Divorce

I have written about international divorce issues before. In Florida, a person must have resided in Florida for 6 months before the filing of the petition for the court to have jurisdiction over your divorce. The term “reside” generally means a legal residence in Florida with an intention to stay there, as opposed to a temporary residence.

However, in our mobile society many couples have multiple residences where they reside. Some of those residences can be in other countries, and more than one country may have jurisdiction. Will a foreign divorce decree be recognized in the U.S.?

Generally, comity is the recognition that a country gives to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another country, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens.

A U.S. state will respect and give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another jurisdiction, provided that they do not conflict with public policy. Comity ensures that international divorce decrees will be recognized and enforced across different countries.

Cowboys, Curry, and Comity

On appeal, the Husband argued the court didn’t have subject matter jurisdiction to grant a divorce because they were no longer married. The appellate court noted that states, however, are not required to give full faith and credit to every single foreign divorce decree. Dismissal of a case based on comity is a matter of discretion for a trial court.

In this case, the only evidence the Wife received notice about the Pakistani divorce proceeding was an email from the Husband stating: “I am attaching NADRA divorce certificate for your records” and a one-sentence text message saying: “to fulfill religious obligation, I have pronounced verbal divorce today.”

The Husband argued Pakistan is not required to follow Texas-specific due process laws or rules. The appellate court agreed Pakistan did not have to follow American notions of due process. But, a U.S. court can refuse to recognize judgments obtained without due process. Since there was never notice to Wife of the Pakistani proceedings until after a judgment was rendered, she was deprived of minimum due process, and the international decree was not recognized.

The opinion is available at MKFL International Family Law.

New Article Hague Abduction Convention Not Your Typical Custody Case

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

My new article “The Hague Abduction Convention: Not Your Typical Custody Case”, discusses a problem frequently encountered by lawyers representing parents in international child custody disputes. The problem is parents treating their Hague Abduction Convention case as if it were any other custody case. The article is now available on the KidSide website.

Hague Court

Hague Abduction Convention

The Hague Abduction Convention is the primary mechanism to ensure the return of children who have been wrongfully removed or retained from their country of habitual residence. The two main purposes behind the Convention are to protect children from the harm of an international abduction and secure the left behind parent’s rights of access to their child.

However, many parents confuse the purposes of the Convention, mistakenly thinking their best defense rests on proving what a better parent they are. It comes as a surprise to many people to learn that the judge in a Convention case does not even have jurisdiction to hear their child custody dispute.

But before any defenses are even asserted, a parent seeking a child’s return must first prove their case. To prove a case under the Convention, a Petitioner must demonstrate where the habitual residence of the child was before the wrongful removal; that the removal breached custody rights; and at the time of the child’s removal those rights were actually exercised.

There are a limited number of available defenses under the Hague Abduction Convention, and those defenses are different from a typical child custody case. They are different because the purposes of the Convention are different. Given that courts in a Convention case cannot decide the merits of the custody dispute, typical arguments about the best interest of the child don’t have much traction, leaving a limited number of defenses.

KidSide

Child abduction cases under the Hague Convention have a negative impact on children. Add to that, the growing number of high-conflict court cases, like divorce and domestic violence. Because of the growing number of high-conflict cases, there is always a lack of support for kids caught in the legal system.

That’s where KidSide comes in.

KidSide is a 501(c)3 which supports the Family Court Services Unit of the Miami-Dade County, Florida courthouse – the largest judicial circuit in Florida. KidSide can use your support as it supports Family Court Services.

Together, they have been providing crucial services to children and families for more than 20 years. The Unit assists all judges and general magistrates with some of the Court’s most difficult family cases by providing solution-focused and brief therapeutic interventions.

KidSide helps the Family Court Services Unit provide services for families at no cost in the areas of alienation, child/family assistance, co-parenting, crisis assistance, marital reconciliation, parenting coordination, reunification, time-sharing, supervised visitation, and monitored exchanges.

They are staffed with dedicated professionals who are committed to helping families reduce their level of conflict and provide supportive services for the entire family system with particular sensitivity to children.

You can support KidSide by clicking here.

The Kidside article is here.