Year: 2025

Are TikTok Gifts Divorce Dissipation or Just Good Business

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

TikTok allows you to make monetary gifts. After one husband made over $300,000 in marital gifts to others on TikTok during his divorce, a court must decide if it is wasteful dissipation or just good business. It is easier than you think to spend and hide marital assets online as one New York trial court discovers.

Tik Tok Divorce

New York State of Mind

Social Media “gifts” allow a social influencer online to earn real money from followers. TikTok revolutionized online content monetization for creators, and now offers an array of over 100 different gifts. For example, an “I Love You” gift is valued at 49 coins and is worth approximately 65¢. On the other end of the spectrum, a “TikTok Universe” gift has a value of 44,999 coins which is worth about $562.

On April 9, 2025, a couple filed for divorce in New York after eight years of marriage. There are three children of the marriage. Most notably, the Husband and Wife are both attorneys licensed to practice law in the State of New York.

At a recent hearing, the Wife asked the court to appoint a guardian ad litem over her Husband, not the children. In New York, a guardian ad litem can be appointed for a litigant if the litigant appears to be in an “apparently chronic irrational and agitated state” resulting in the individual’s inability to effectively litigate their case without assistance.

To prove a guardian was appropriate, she alleged her Husband had become increasingly paranoid, erratic and aggressive on his TikTok “live streams” and was actively dissipating marital assets.

The court heard evidence of the Husband’s recordings on TikTok some of which were filmed right outside the courtroom:

“CJB [the husband] got Court tomorrow. Ain’t no mother fucking judge check me. CJB is vibing right now. Don’t worry about the consequences.”

In his defense, the Husband characterized his TikTok expenditures as investments rather than gifts. He confirmed that he spent at least $300,000.00 on TikTok, approximately $275,000.00 after the divorce was filed: “So, Judge, when it comes to give away money, I don’t — I can’t affirmatively say I have given away money. Have I made — these are marketing and business expenses.”

Florida Dissipation

I’ve written about dissipation of marital assets before. In a divorce proceeding, when distributing the marital assets between spouses, a family court must begin with the premise that the distribution should be equal, unless there is a justification for an unequal distribution based on all relevant factors.

One factor is whether one of the parties intentionally dissipated, wasted, depleted, or destroyed any of the marital assets after the filing of the petition or within two years prior to the filing of the petition.

For an expenditure to be considered dissipation, there must be evidence of intentional misconduct. This means that the spending spouse must have intentionally used marital funds for their own benefit and for a purpose unrelated to the marriage. Simple mismanagement or squandering of an asset, even if the other spouse disapproves, does not constitute dissipation.

It’s up to you New York

In the New York case, the court appointed a guardian ad litem for the Husband as the Wife met the criteria. The Husband was found to have engaged in dishonest conduct. He represented to the court he was represented by legal counsel, and then admitted he had not yet retained counsel.

Additionally, the Husband was in violation of New York’s Automatic Orders by failing to file a statement of net worth. Moreover, the Husband admitted to the judge that he had been spending approximately $275,000.00 on TikTok after the commencement of this action.

The New York decision is available here.

The Risks of a Divorce Without a Prenuptial Agreement

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

Prominent Hollywood entertainment executive, David Geffen, may learn if there are risks in a divorce without a prenuptial agreement. Geffen is currently married to his husband of two years, David Armstrong, a 32-year old dancer. A California court will apply community property and other laws to determine what risks, if any, Geffen faces if he is not able to resolve his divorce amicably.

Divorce Prenup

Risky Business

Geffen rose from modest beginnings in Brooklyn to become one of the world’s best film producers and record executives. In rock and roll, Geffen is a founder of Asylum Records and Geffen Records. He has worked with Elton John, Cher, Weezer, Blink 182, Guns N’ Roses, and Nirvana.

As a film producer, Geffen’s credits include “Risky Business” and “Beetlejuice before forming DreamWorks SKG with Steven Spielberg and Jeffrey Katzenberg. DreamWorks won Best Picture for the films American Beauty, Gladiator, and A Beautiful Mind, and was later sold to Paramount for $1.6 billion.

Then in 2008, at ate 65, he mostly stayed away from the business. Citing “irreconcilable differences,” Geffen intends to pay alimony — generally for a duration of about half the length of the two-year marriage – which could be sizeable given Geffen has an estimate net worth of more than $8 billion. Most interesting though, the divorce petition indicates that the couple did not sign a prenuptial agreement.

Florida Prenuptial Agreements

I’ve written about prenuptial agreements before. Prenuptial agreements are about more than just resolving uncertainty in a marriage.

When a spouse is a major shareholder of company, such as a movie studio, the stock price can be subject to wide price swings. For example, when the head of Continental Resources was getting divorced, shares of his company dropped 2.9%.

Conversely, when Rupert Murdoch announced his divorce, shares of News Corp gained 1.4%. Why? Because in Rupert Murdoch’s case, the divorce announcement stressed his prenuptial agreement, and a divorce would have “zero impact” on the company.

A prenuptial agreement (or “prenup” for short) is a contract between people intending to marry. A prenup determines spousal rights when the marriage ends by death or divorce. This can be especially important in second marriages.

If you divorce without a prenup, your property rights are determined under state law, and a spouse may have a claim to alimony while the suit for divorce is pending and after entry of a judgment.

That’s where prenups come in. Prospective spouses may limit or expand state laws by an agreement. Prenups are also used to protect the interests of children from a prior marriage, and to avoid a contested divorce. Prenups can be a reliable guide down rough rivers if they’re done right.

Little Shop of Horrors?

Marrying without a prenuptial agreement may not have to be a horror show, but will likely be more expensive than marrying without one for Geffen. He has many things in his favor going into settlement negotiations.

Geffen and Armstrong have a short-term marriage of two-years. Armstrong is 32 years old, and at age 82, Geffen is rumored to have slowed down in business. These facts may work out in Geffen’s favor financially.

It’s not clear why Geffen, a highly successful businessman, did not have a prenup. Early indications are that the divorce is amicable so far, which could suit everyone well.

The New York Times article is here.

Divorce, Dissipation and an $1,800 Scotch

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

The dissipation of marital assets in divorce is always something to watch for, especially when the marital asset is a $1,800 bottle of 1976 The Glenrothes Single Cask Single Malt Scotch Whisky. An Ohio court recently had to decide what to do when an expensive bottle of Scotch turned up missing.

Dissipation Divorce

The Shot

If, as they say, ‘all happy families are alike, and each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way’ the case of the missing scotch is proof. In the recent Ohio matter the Mother and Father had been married over twenty years. Together, they raised three children, two now-adult children and one minor child. The Mother, Father, and child lived together in a house located in Blue Ash, Ohio outside of Cincinnati.

Then in April 2022, ongoing marital problems caused the couple to separate, and the Father moved out of their Blue Ash home. Following their separation, the relationship between the parties continued to deteriorate. Father eventually asked for an received a domestic violence injunction against Mother.

During the final hearing in their dissolution of the marriage, among the many claims, the Father argued that the Mother had denied him the opportunity to retrieve his personal items from the Blue Ash home. During the trial, the Father testified he had left behind his family memorabilia, some religious heirlooms, and most importantly, a bottle of 1976 Glenrothes Single Malt Scotch before he had moved out of the marital home.

The Father explained to the court that while he was given a brief opportunity to collect a few of his personal items from the home, the Mother never gave him a sufficient opportunity to meaningfully collect his belongings. He testified the Mother told him that she put the items he had left behind in storage and that he would be able to retrieve them the next time she was in Ohio.

Despite the Mother’s telling him that his personal possessions were in storage, and that he would be able to retrieve them, it was just not so. In fact, the Mother would later testify that she called a trash service and had all of the Father’s personal property (his heirlooms, religious mementos, and of course, the Scotch) destroyed. She also admitted that she did not tell the Father before tossing his personal belongings in the municipal dump.

At the trial, the court ruled that because of the Mother’s destruction of Father’s bottle of 1976 Glenrothes Single Malt Scotch and his other personal effects, she was to pay him $5,000. The Mother appealed.

Florida Dissipation

I’ve written about dissipation of marital assets before. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, when distributing the marital assets between spouses, a family court must begin with the premise that the distribution should be equal, unless there is a justification for an unequal distribution based on all relevant factors.

Some of the factors to justify an unequal distribution of the property include things like the financial situation the parties, the length of the marriage, whether someone has interrupted their career or an educational opportunity, or how much one spouse contributed to the other’s career or education.

Another important factor is whether one of the parties intentionally dissipated, wasted, depleted, or destroyed any of the marital assets after the filing of the petition or within two years prior to the filing of the petition.

Dissipation of marital assets, such as spending marital funds on extramarital relationships, excessive gambling, and drug use, are examples which happens a lot. Less common is gifting your husband’s $1,800 bottle of scotch whiskey to trash collectors. Misconduct may serve as a basis for assigning the dissipated asset to the spending spouse when calculating equitable distribution.

When considering whether the dissipation of an asset resulted from misconduct, courts look to see if a spouse used marital funds for his or her own benefit and for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time when the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown. Merely mismanaging or simple squandering of marital assets is not enough. There has to be evidence of intentional dissipation or destruction.

The Chaser

On appeal, the Mother took issue with the court’s $5,000 contempt penalty for having Father’s items destroyed. The appellate court found that the penalty constituted an equitable offset because the Mother had denied Father the opportunity to collect his equitable distribution of household goods and furnishings.

This offset included all “remaining household goods, keepsakes, and furnishings,” which would include the bottle of 1976 Glenrothes Single Malt Scotch.  Accordingly, the appellate court rule the Mother’s claim that the family court failed to include the value of the bottle of scotch in the marital assets was without merit.

The Ohio Court of Appeal opinion is here.

Punishment and Domestic Violence

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

When does child discipline cross the line between punishment and domestic violence? It is a frequent child custody issue which can impact parental rights and timesharing. After a Colorado ski vacation, two parents found out how Florida courts look at punishing your teenager for marijuana, theft, and ingratitude.

Punishment Domestic Violence

Rocky Mountain High

The two Florida parents divorced in 2018. About four years after their divorce, a domestic violence injunction was filed by the mother against the father on behalf of their fourteen-year-old daughter. The Mother alleged in her petition that the father had punched the daughter; grabbed her by the hair, and then sat on his daughter. Worse, while sitting on top of her, the father continued to punch and slap his daughter.

At the trial, the Father testified that he and his daughter had just returned from a Colorado ski vacation during the winter holidays. When they returned, his daughter had given him a pair of socks as a gift. Either very suspicious, or just unhappy with his gift, the father suspected the gift socks were stolen.

The father searched the daughter’s room to see if there were other stolen items. In her backpack from the ski trip to Colorado, the father found marijuana, a pipe, and a vape pen. Colorado, remember, became the first state in the U.S. to sell legal recreational marijuana for adult use. The father announced he was going to punish the daughter for stealing, lying, and possessing marijuana and a vape pen by taking away her most cherished item, her phone.

The daughter refused to give the father her phone, obviously, and they ended up tussling over it. At some point, the daughter snapped the father’s finger back and broke it.

The father refused to return her phone, and the daughter threw a metal thermos and an orange juice bottle. Father denied punching her, pulling her hair, or sitting on her. The daughter told the neighbor she had gotten into an argument with her father but did not need the neighbor to call the police.

The daughter then went back to the father’s house. The neighbor testified the daughter did not seem fearful to return to her father’s house. She then came back to the neighbor’s house and asked for a ride to the mother’s house. During the car ride, the neighbor did not see any physical injuries on the daughter

The mother testified she saw a bruise on the daughter’s back, leg, and arm. The mother took pictures of the bruises. A Child Protection Investigator testified there were “no indicators of mental or physical injury because the parties were deemed as mutual combatants.” The CPI observed “a little black and blue” on the daughter’s shoulder and arm but no bruising or marks. The guardian ad litem for the child also testified, and said it was a mutual combatant situation, and “absolutely 100 percent inappropriate.”

The trial court found there was competent substantial evidence that the daughter is in fear, and granted the injunction for six months. Father appealed.

Punishment in Florida

I’ve written about spanking and custody before. In Florida, parents have a right to discipline their child in a reasonable manner. Florida has strong laws for the protection against domestic violence. Domestic violence includes any assault, battery or any other offense resulting in physical injury of a family member by another family member.

However, parents have to discipline their children, and as the good book says:

“Whoever spares the rod hates their children, but the one who loves their children is careful to discipline them.”

A parent’s right to administer reasonable corporal punishment to discipline a child is not a crime when it does not result in harm to the child. Harm, by the way, does not mean just bruises or welts. Harm also means that the discipline is likely to result in physical injury, mental injury, or emotional injury. Even if you don’t physically harm a child, your actions could be criminal.

Florida’s parental privilege to use corporal discipline does not give absolute immunity either. Your run-of-the-mill spanking may be protected from charges of child abuse, but sitting on your child, punching her on the floor and pulling her hair is not. While there are some limited privileges for discipline, there are major risks to your custody case, your domestic violence case, and most importantly, to your children.

The High Court

The argument by the father on appeal was that the altercation between he and his cellphone addicted teenage daughter was nothing more than the father exercising his right to discipline his child. He argued his actions were appropriate physical discipline, rather than an assault, battery, aggravated assault, or aggravated battery.

There was also no history of domestic violence by the father toward the daughter or evidence that would give her a reason to believe she was about to be subjected to domestic violence. The injunction was based solely on the one post-Colorado ski trip incident between a father and his teenage daughter in which he physically wrenched the cellphone from her.

The 4th DCA reversed. The father’s physical and verbal actions in taking away the daughter’s cell phone was a form of physical discipline, not corporal punishment. The appellate court ruled that even if it was punishment, it was not excessive corporal punishment because the daughter refused to surrender her phone, and there was no evidence of disfigurement or significant bruising on the child.

The opinion is available here.

Fighting Paternity and UCCJEA Jurisdiction

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

A husband and wife, who marry in Brazil, agree the husband does not have paternity and is not the legal father of their daughter. But that does not stop them from fighting UCCJEA jurisdiction in Florida. What happens when the court disagrees with them that he’s not the Father? A married couple just found out the results in an interesting international child custody case.

UCCJEA Paternity

The Girl from Ipanema

The Wife is a Brazilian citizen living in Rio de Janeiro not far from the famous beach. The Husband is a U.S. citizen, a commercial airline pilot, and resides in Florida. The parties met online in 2014. They later were married in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil in 2016.

The wife had a daughter born in Brazil in 2015, the year before they got married. Interestingly, while the wife acknowledged she was the biological mother, the parties stipulated that the husband was not the biological father.

However, the Husband added his last name to the child’s name on the child’s birth certificate in Brazil. Later, they went to the U.S. Consulate in Brazil, and had a Consular Report of Birth Abroad Certificate issued for the child using his citizenship and his last name for the child.

Next, they had issued a U.S. passport and a Brazilian passport for the child using his last name as the father as well. It was later found that the husband held himself out as the father of his daughter during the marriage. The parties owned one marital asset, a home in Naples, Florida.

In 2021, the Husband filed a petition for divorce in Florida seeking only the following relief: (1) a dissolution of marriage and (2) and equitable distribution of the home in Naples. The Wife filed an answer denying allegations but did not raise the issue of the child, custody, or child support.

During the case, the parties entered a partial marital settlement agreement resolving all of the financial issues, including equitable distribution of the home. However, nothing was agreed, or mentioned, about their daughter.

Instead, the parties filed a stipulation that the husband was not the father of the child. Additionally, the husband filed an objection before trial that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear child support and custody under the UCCJEA because Florida was not the home state of the child.

The family judge entered a amended final judgment finding that the husband was the legal father of the child, and reserved jurisdiction on child support.

The Husband filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that under the UCCJEA, a court in Florida has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if Florida is the home state of the child or was the home state of the child within 6 months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent continues to live in Florida. The court denied the motion for reconsideration and the husband appealed.

Florida UCCJEA

I have written about international child custody issues before. The UCCJEA is a uniform act drafted to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with other state courts in child custody matters; promote cooperation with other courts; ensure that a custody decree is rendered in the state which enjoys the superior position to decide what is in the best interest of the child; deter controversies and avoid re-litigation of custody issues; facilitate enforcement of custody decrees; and promote uniformity of the laws governing custody issues.

An important aspect of the UCCJEA is that it only covers child custody determinations. Under the UCCJEA, a “child custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, residential care, or visitation with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and modification order. The definition does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual.

The UCCJEA deals with “child custody proceedings,” which are defined as proceedings in which legal custody, physical custody, residential care, or visitation with respect to a child is an issue. Child Custody proceedings do not include proceedings involving juvenile delinquency, contractual emancipation, or enforcement.

Although not part of the UCCJEA, under Florida law, the husband could have also faced additional challenges. For instance, if a mother of any child born out of wedlock and the reputed father intermarry, the child is deemed and held to be the child of the husband and wife, as though born within wedlock.

Boa Sorte

On appeal, the third district affirmed that the husband was the legal father of their daughter. The court noted that the UCCJEA was a jurisdictional act which controls custody disputes and only applies where custody is at issue.

The term custody includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear.

But, a child custody determination does not include an order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individual. In this case, the appellate court found that the parties did not dispute custody of the minor child. As a result, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over the action.

The opinion is here.

Travel Restrictions to Hague Convention Countries

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

A recurring international custody problem is should a court place travel restrictions on parents who want to travel internationally to only travel to Hague Convention countries with the children? A married couple from China finds out the extent to which a family court can place such travel restrictions.

Travel Restrictions

China Visit

Zhenzhen Wang (the Wife) and Shengyi Ye (the Husband) were married in Iowa in 2008.  They share two children—a son and a daughter. In 2019, Shengyi took a job as a professor in China, while Zhenzhen and the children remained in Iowa.

In 2022, the wife and children visited the husband in China. One day while driving in the car, the parents started fighting, which resulted in the husband abandoning the wife and the children on the side of the road.  She took a taxi back to his apartment, where she discovered he had removed the children’s passports, travel documents, and birth certificates from her backpack.

Although he at first denied taking the documents, he later refused to give them back, preventing her and the children from leaving the country. It ultimately took Zhenzhen “six or seven months” to reorder all of the travel documents and return to Iowa.

When the wife and children returned home to Iowa, she petitioned to dissolve the marriage. Shengyi then filed a competing lawsuit in China, which was ultimately dismissed.

The Iowa court awarded her sole legal custody of the children. After considering his prior conduct preventing the children from returning to home to the U.S., and that China may not enforce a United States custodial order, the court required that the father have visitation with the children only in the U.S.

The court also provided him up to ten consecutive weeks of visitation with the children over the summer, and up to four weeks at a time should he travel to the United States during the school year. The husband appealed, arguing that he should be able to take the children to China for visitation.

Florida and the Hague Convention

I often speak and write about the Hague Abduction Convention and international child custody issues. The International Child Abduction Remedies Act is the statute in the United States that implements the Hague Abduction Convention.

Under the Act, a person may petition a court authorized to exercise jurisdiction in the country where a child is located for the return of the child to his or her habitual residence in another signatory country, so the underlying child custody dispute can be determined in the proper jurisdiction.

But it is important to know that the Convention applies as between contracting states only to wrongful removals or retentions occurring after its entry into force in those states. The accession will have effect only as regards the relations between the acceding State and such Contracting States as will have declared their acceptance of the accession.

In plain language, the Convention enters into force between an acceding State and a member Contracting State only when the Contracting State accepts the acceding State’s accession to the Convention.

Appellate Decision

The appellate court noted that limiting a parent’s ability to travel internationally with his or her children implicates heightened, and at times conflicting, interests. On the one hand, despite the virtues of our state, the court noted:

“[t]he world does not end at the borders of Iowa.”

Children should not easily be denied the opportunity to build meaningful relationships with a parent who resides outside of the United States or fully experience their dual heritage. On the other hand, there may be problems securing the return from a foreign country of a child to a custodial parent in the United States.

The danger of retention of a child in a country where retrieving the child is difficult, if not impossible, is a major factor for a court to weigh. Courts also consider other factors, such as the parent’s domicile, the reasons for visiting, the children’s safety, the age of the children, the parents’ relationship, the viability of bonds or other return measures, and the character and integrity of the parent seeking out-of-country visitation as gleaned from past comments and conduct.

The Iowa Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed. The appeals court noted that China is not a party to the Hague Convention, so the mother would have no recourse should the husband refuse to return the children to the United States.

The Court of Appeals of Iowa decision is here.

Hague Abduction Convention and Force Majeure Clause

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

Under the Hague Child Convention does a force majeure clause in a marital settlement agreement hold any weight? The question is a frequent international custody issue which arises after parents enter into an agreement allowing their children to travel internationally. In one recent case, two Israeli parents agreed to their children visiting the United States for 60-days with some exceptions.

Force Majeure

Parents at War

The parties in the Hague case are the parents of two children who were both born and raised in Israel. The family members are all Israeli citizens too, but the Mother was also a U.S. citizen. The parties divorced in 2019 in Israel. After the divorce, the Israeli family court awarded the Father with visitation rights, and ordered him to pay child support.

The Mother argued the Father never exercised his rights of custody. However, the Mother would also travel internationally alone, and leave the children with their Father and his new wife. The Father was found to have exercised his visitation rights with the children.

In January 2023, the Mother filed an action in Israel to collect back child-support from the Father. The parents reached an agreement in the Israeli family court in which they stopped collection proceedings, and in return, the Father agreed to let the Mother travel abroad with their two children under certain conditions.

The Mother was allowed to travel internationally with the Children for 60 days. She could extend the 60-day period either by agreement with the Father, and/or limitations unrelated to the Mother’s own actions, such as strikes, COVID-related restrictions, etc.

Then Israel was brutally attacked on October 7, 2023. A month later, the Mother flew with the Children, and her two twins from another relationship, to Florida. The Father agreed to the trip, but then objected after the Mother told him that she planned to keep the Children in Florida until at least January 23, 2024 – 76 days after leaving Israel – and possibly longer if the war persisted.

By April 2024, the Mother had still not returned the Children. Then she dropped the bomb on the Father: she had “discovered that we have peace of mind and a calm life here” and told him that the children didn’t want to return to Israel.

The Father was trapped. He was not allowed to travel to the U.S., and was restricted from holding a passport, due to his owing child-support. The Father then filed a petition for return of the children to Israel under the Hague Convention in a Florida federal court.

At the time of trial from January to February 2025, the parties disagreed as to whether the conditions in Israel, and in particular, whether the cities where each of them lived were safe to return to and an exception to return under their agreement.

Florida Hague Convention

I often speak and write about the Hague Abduction Convention and international child custody issues. In fact, I successfully represented the Father in this Israeli case. What do you do if your children are wrongfully abducted or retained internationally?

The Hague Abduction Convention establishes legal rights and procedures for the prompt return of children who have been wrongfully removed or retained.

The International Child Abduction Remedies Act is the statute in the United States that implements the Hague Abduction Convention. Under the Act, a person may petition a court authorized to exercise jurisdiction in the country where a child is located for the return of the child to his or her habitual residence in another signatory country, so the underlying child custody dispute can be determined in the proper jurisdiction.

The Hague Convention applies only in jurisdictions that have signed the convention, and its reach is limited to children under 16 years of age. Essentially, The Hague Convention helps families more quickly revert back to the “status quo” child custody arrangement before the wrongful child abduction.

The Hague Convention exists to protect children from international abductions by requiring the prompt return to their habitual residence. But there are defenses too. In the Israeli case, one defense asserted  involved an agreement containing a force majeure clause. Essentially, the court was not bound to order the return of the children if the Mother demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the Father gave prior consent to the retention or subsequently acquiesced in their retention.

The argument was central to the case because the Mother relied on language in the agreed child support order that allowed her to travel abroad with the children for up to 60 days unless there was some limitation unrelated to the Mother’s own actions, “e.g., strikes, COVID-related restrictions, etc.”

Force Majeure?

At trial, the Mother argued that, even if the Father had a right of custody under Israeli law, the conditions in Israel following the October 7, 2023 attack qualify as a limitation unrelated to Respondent under the language of the Agreement, which would permit her to keep the Children in Florida beyond 60 days.

The district court disagreed. “The term ‘limitation’ in the Agreement does not encompass the Mother’s personal judgment or view that returning the Children to Israel is unsafe.” In looking at the parties’ agreement, the district court concluded that, based on its customary and normal meaning, “[t]he agreement itself illustrates this definition [of limitation], citing examples such as ‘strikes’ and ‘COVID-19-related restrictions’ – situations that physically restrict Respondent’s ability to return the Children.”

The district court found that a qualifying limitation under the Agreement is one that impedes or prevents the Mother from returning the Children, not one that merely makes return undesirable according to the Mother.

The case is analyzed at MKFL International Family Law here.

Establishing Foreign Paternity under UIFSA

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

A common family law issue involves UIFSA, in that a U.S. state can establish a child support order after proving the paternity of the father over a foreign born child. However, proof is required beyond mere admissions and agreement. Is being named on the birth certificate enough? One couple recently found out.

UIFSA Parentage

Love in Lansing

The Plaintiff lives in Brazil and is the mother of LCK, who was born in Brazil in late 2020. The purported father, who was the Defendant in the case, lives in Michigan. The case was heard in a town between Detroit and Lansing. Plaintiff contended that defendant is the father of LCK, arising out of a relationship between the parties in Michigan in January 2020.

Defendant did not deny that the parties had a relationship during that time. In August 2021, plaintiff sought child support from defendant under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), by filing an Application for Establishment of a Decision with the central authority in Brazil.

The application stated that defendant’s paternity of the child was “established or presumed,” and was supported by a Brazil birth certificate naming defendant as the child’s father.

The Livingston County Prosecutor initiated this action under UIFSA, filing the Application as a complaint.  Defendant responded, denying paternity and requesting that the child’s paternity be established.  Defendant also filed a -separate paternity action in the trial court.

In contrast to his denial of paternity in the child support case, defendant alleged in his paternity action that he is the father of LCK. In fact, the defendant earlier claimed he was the LCK’s father in the paternity action, and even signed an affidavit before the U.S. Consulate stating that he was the father.

However, in the international child support action under the UIFSA, he disputed his paternity of the child had been established under Brazil law. Plaintiff contended that defendant’s name on the child’s birth certificate established his paternity under Brazil law, precluding further inquiry into the child’s parentage under the UIFSA. Defendant disagreed, and asked the trial court to resolve the paternity action before determining the child support action. Plaintiff filed a motion to establish support, arguing without explanation that the birth certificate alone established defendant’s paternity of the child under Brazil law.

Plaintiff also asserted that while briefly visiting Brazil, defendant signed an acknowledgment of paternity at the United States Consulate to obtain a passport for the child, and sued plaintiff under the Hague Convention for abduction of the child.

Defendant did not respond to the motion, but at the hearing requested a determination of paternity under Michigan law. The trial court entered a Uniform Child Support Final Order on the basis that defendant had been established as the child’s father under Brazil law, and ordered defendant to pay plaintiff monthly child support of $1,567. The father appealed.

Florida UIFSA

I have written on international custody and support issues before. The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act is one of the uniform acts drafted by the Uniform Law Commission. First developed in 1992, UIFSA resolves interstate jurisdictional disputes about which states can properly establish and modify child support and spousal support orders.

The UIFSA also controls the issue of enforcement of family support obligations within the United States. In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, which required all U.S. states adopt UIFSA, or face loss of federal funding for child support enforcement. Every U.S. state has adopted some version of UIFSA to resolve interstate disputes about support.

One of the more important purposes of UIFSA is to extend enforcement to foreign support orders. A court in Florida, for example, must apply UIFSA to any support proceeding involving a foreign support order from a foreign tribunal. A “foreign tribunal” means a court, administrative agency, or quasi-judicial entity of a foreign country which is authorized to establish, enforce, or modify support orders or to determine parentage of a child.

Spartan Findings

On appeal, the Defendant contended the trial court erred by determining his parentage of the child had been determined under Brazil law without permitting him to challenge the parentage of the child.

A trial court can establish child support under UIFSA only upon finding, after notice and an opportunity to be heard, that defendant had a duty of support based on the putative father’s paternity. In doing so, the trial court was obligated to apply the procedural and substantive law of Michigan.

In determining Defendant was the father based on the Brazilian birth certificate, the trial court accepted plaintiff’s contention under Brazil law, any man designated as the father on a child’s birth certificate is thereby determined by law to be the father of that child, and that defendant therefore was precluded from raising the defense of non-parentage.

However, the trial court accepted the contention that parentage had been established under Brazil law without any proof and without any authority to support plaintiff’s assertion.

Plaintiff also argued that she established paternity because of Defendant’s past claims that he was the child’s father in the paternity action, and that he even signed an affidavit before the U.S. Consulate stating that he was the child’s father.

But on appeal, the question was whether the was precluded from challenging the child’s parentage by virtue of a previous legal determination in Brazil or elsewhere.  Defendant’s past assertions of parentage are not relevant to this narrow inquiry.

Even though defendant consistently sought to establish the parentage of the child, he never conceded the issue had been determined under Brazil law.  The trial court’s reliance on plaintiff’s unsupported assertion that the birth certificate naming defendant as the father constituted a determination of parentage under Brazil law, was insufficient.

The trial court’s order was vacated, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in which plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant’s parentage of the child has been determined under Brazilian law.

The Michigan Court of Appeals opinion is here.

De Facto Parents and Child Custody

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

Can someone ask a court for custody of a child if they are not the parent or legal guardian but act as the de facto parent? The Georgia Supreme Court just looked at that child custody question in weighing the constitutionality of Georgia’s Equitable Caregiver Act.

De Facto Parent

Georgia On My Mind

These days, a parent-child relationship is becoming hard to define. Cultural norms have changed, and increasingly we have embraced nontraditional families.

Imagine you and your child move in with your parents or significant other, and you rely on them to care for your child while you work. After several years, you get into a fight about parenting, move out, and limit their time with your child. Are your parents or Ex considered equal legal parents? Can a judge to decide how much visitation grandparents or your former significant other has with your child?

Roughly 38 states now recognize the concept of a “de facto parent,” where legal rights are rooted in the person’s relationship to the child as opposed to blood. And in 2019, Georgia Republican Gov. Brian Kemp signed the “Equitable Caregiver Act,” which gives people the right to ask for custody if they can prove they have a “permanent, unequivocal, committed and responsible parental role” for the child.

Abby Boone believed she met that description. She helped raise a young girl for the first four years of the child’s life along with her partner, Michelle Dias. The girl is a cousin of Dias, who legally adopted her in 2011. Boone was not part of that adoption, but the court noted the girl’s middle name is listed as “Boone” on the child’s new birth certificate.

The child, M.D., was born in October 2010. Michelle Dias, who adopted M.D. in March 2011, was in a romantic relationship with Abby Boone, who helped care for M.D. from six weeks old but was not a party to the adoption.

After their breakup, Boone remained involved in M.D.’s life until 2018, when Dias cut off contact. In August 2019, Boone sought “equitable caregiver” status under Georgia’s newly enacted law, which allows a non-parent to be adjudicated as a caregiver with parental rights.

The trial court found that Boone met the statutory requirements and granted her joint legal custody and visitation rights in January 2024. Dias appealed, arguing the statute was unconstitutional because it infringed on a parent’s fundamental right to the custody and control of their child.

Florida De Facto Parent

I’ve written about parental responsibility in Florida before. In Florida, “custody” is a concept we have done away with. Florida uses the parental responsibility concept. Generally, shared parental responsibility is a relationship ordered by a court in which both parents retain their full parental rights and responsibilities.

Under shared parental responsibility, parents are required to confer with each other and jointly make major decisions affecting the welfare of their child. In Florida, shared parental responsibility is the preferred relationship between parents when a marriage or a relationship ends. In fact, courts are instructed to order parents to share parental responsibility of a child unless it would be detrimental to the child.

A grandparent and a stepparent do not acquire all of the rights or assume all of the obligations of a child’s natural parent in Florida. A grandparent may be awarded some visitation rights in very limited situations, such as when the child’s parents are deceased, missing, or in a permanent vegetative state.

Florida does not have a de facto or psychological parent law like Georgia’s. Generally, timesharing and visitation rights are statutory, and the court has no inherent authority to award visitation between a child and one who is neither a parent, grandparent, nor great-grandparent. Our supreme court, citing the fundamental and constitutional right of privacy, has unequivocally reaffirmed adoptive or biological parents’ right to make decisions about their children’s welfare without interference by third parties, and the state cannot intervene into a parent’s fundamental or constitutionally protected right of privacy, either via the judicial system or legislation, absent a showing of demonstrable harm to the child.

Just Peachy

The Georgia Supreme Court declined to resolve the constitutional challenges, instead it interpreted the statute to avoid retroactive application. The Supreme Court held the statute lacked a clear legislative intent for retroactive application. Accordingly, to apply it to a pre-2019 relationship – Dias was fostering Boone’s relationship with M.D. before the statute existed – would impermissibly ascribe new legal consequences to past actions, violating due process principles.

As a result of the refusal to apply the statute retroactively, the trial court’s order was reversed because the statute could not constitutionally apply to conduct predating its enactment, and the Court vacated Boone’s equitable caregiver status and custody rights.

The Georgia Supreme Court opinion is here.

Family Law, Free Speech & Insulting a Lawyer

Posted by Ron Kauffman on

In family law cases, courts can issue injunctions that curb your right to free speech, especially if children are involved but maybe not if you are insulting a lawyer. A recent case out of Michigan asks if the trial court can protect a divorce lawyer against threats from a dissatisfied former client.

Speech Restriction Family Law

Chilling Speech

A former husband was placed on probation after pleading no contest to two violations of a domestic violence injunction that prohibited him from contacting his ex-wife. As a condition of his probation, he was barred from engaging in “any assaultive, abusive, threatening, or intimidating behavior.”

While he was out on probation, the former husband violated his probation because of a series of e-mails he sent over the course of a month to his former attorney who represented him in his divorce and the injunction proceeding.

Cruelly, he called his former lawyer a “pussy” and a “negligent piece of shit,” accusing him of “ignor[ing] child abuse” and owing the former husband money, and finished with a: “Fuck you.”

In his later e-mails, he copied various other people, including the county prosecutor, and referred to his former lawyer as a “fraud” and a “twat,” accused him of breaking the law, and even accused the presiding judge of ignoring evidence of child abuse and parental alienation.

Some of the e-mails included photos, such as a photo of the presiding judge and his family at a judicial investiture and another of the former husband’s children, edited to appear as though they were in a jail cell.

The former lawyer reported the emails to the probation officer, who filed a warrant request alleging a technical probation violation for his “threatening/intimidating behavior”. At the probation violation hearing, the former lawyer testified that the e-mails made him fear for his safety.  He also testified about several telephone calls in which he allegedly threatened him, although he could not recall the substance of those threats.

After the presentation of evidence, the former husband argued that the e-mails were constitutionally protected speech.  The trial court disagreed, finding that he intended to threaten and intimidate his former lawyer, and the speech was not protected under the First Amendment because the language in his e-mails constituted fighting words.  He appeals.

Florida Speech Restrictions to Protect Against Violence

I have written about speech, domestic violence in family law cases before. To state a cause of action for protection against domestic violence in Florida, you must allege sufficient facts demonstrating that you are a victim of domestic violence or have reasonable cause to believe you are in imminent danger of becoming a victim. Domestic violence means, in part, any assault, battery, or any criminal offense resulting in physical injury of one family or household member by another family or household member.

An injunction against domestic violence requires malicious harassment that consists at the very least of some threat of imminent violence, which excludes mere uncivil behavior that causes distress or annoyance. Fighting words, or words that would tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace could be actionable but it would depend on the circumstances.

Muffled in the Mitten State

On appeal, the former husband complained the trial court violated his First Amendment rights by finding him guilty of a probation violation based on constitutionally protected speech.

Under the Constitution, protected speech under the First Amendment includes expressions or ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find distasteful or discomforting.” However, the right to speak freely is not absolute.”

States may restrict certain categories of speech that by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. Here, the trial court erred in concluding that the former husband’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment because it was threatening in nature.

The right to free speech does not extend to “true threats,” which are defined as statements in which “the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.  Excluded from this category are jests, hyperbole, or other statements whose context indicates no real possibility that violence will follow.

To establish a true threat, the State must show that the defendant consciously disregarded a substantial risk that his communications would be viewed as threatening violence. The true-threat exception to the First Amendment encompasses only physical threats, and our Supreme Court explicitly declined to extend the exception to encompass nonphysical threats.

The trial court should have assessed whether the former husband intended to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence against the lawyer or whether the purported threats were physical.

Although his e-mails were offensive and inappropriate, they did not express an intent to commit an act of unlawful physical violence.  Accordingly, his speech did not fall within the true-threat exception to the First Amendment. The emails were also not “fighting words,” personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.

Generally, speech made over the Internet, far removed from any potential violence, is not considered to be inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction. Although the former husband’s language might provoke violence if delivered in person, the fact that it was communicated via e-mail, far removed from any potential violence, renders it unlikely to provoke a violent reaction.

The opinion is here.